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Abstract 
 Cyber-attacks have become common occurrences which have an impact on all 
aspects of life ranging from business transactions to personal communications. 
Alarmingly, coordinated cyber-attacks are increasingly targeting politicians and their 
associates, political campaigns, political organizations and the broader public with 
political messaging. Given the novelty of these new forms of attacks, little is known of 
their potential impact. This thesis argues that states, state-directed actors, or non-state 
actors are disrupting, altering or influencing the electoral process in democratic states 
through coordinated cyber operations. It further argues that the purpose is to increase 
hyper-partisanship and erode the legitimacy of democratically-elected leaders.  
 A quantitative study analyzing the data from a test group of consolidated 
democracies which had experienced these types of cyber operations displayed declining 
confidence in both their national governments and the honesty of their elections. By 
investigating the most prominent and verifiable cyber-attacks against state election 
processes, a connection between the attacks and Russia’s state intelligence services 
became apparent. Further research revealed Russian intelligence agencies’ historic use of 
covert ‘active measures’ and their current efforts to incorporate cyber operations within 
those measures, thus increasing active measures’ versatility and efficiency. Historic and 
geopolitical insight provided by an ex-official from a former Soviet Republic 
contextualized how these new cyber operations could be used to advance Russian 
geopolitical objectives.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Many national security experts and academics are deeply concerned over the 
threat posed by cyber operations. While various forms of cyber operations have become 
common, the alleged use of coordinated cyber operations to affect national elections in 
democratic countries is a new type of occurrence. As a result, there has been little in the 
way of academic research conducted on this new type of vulnerability. Given the limited 
breadth of research material, this thesis will examine public survey data collected from 
states which have allegedly been the victims of a coordinated cyber operations targeting 
national elections with the goal of directing electoral outcomes. Coordinated cyber 
operations appear to have been designed to manipulate a population’s perceptions of 
elected leaders’ legitimacy and partisanship in their national political debates.  
 The issue of electoral interference in democratic states through the use of 
coordinated cyber operations is of critical importance. Attempts to interfere in states’ 
electoral processes, whether or not they are successful, undermine the legitimacy of the 
electoral process which is the bedrock of a functioning democratic state. If the outcome 
of an electoral process is called into question, there will be an erosion of the legitimacy 
that the electoral process bestows on democratically elected leaders. In addition, foreign 
states may gain undue influence in electing leaders who favor the foreign state’s policy 
positions. This erosion of legitimacy may lead to increased hyper-partisanship and can 
sow doubts among the national electorate regarding the policy decisions of any elected 
leader.  
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In researching this thesis, I aim to answer and provide insight into the following 
questions: 
• What is the evidence that there have been verifiable attempts by states, state-
directed actors, or non-state actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral 
process in democratic states through coordinated cyber operations? 
• What were the methods used by states, state-directed actors, or non-state 
actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states 
through coordinated cyber operations? 
• What were the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state 
actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states 
through coordinated cyber operations? 
I argue here that states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors are disrupting, 
altering or influencing the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated 
cyber operations. I further argue that the purpose is to increase hyper-partisanship and 
erode the legitimacy of democratically-elected leaders. This can also lead to undue 
influence and promote candidates that support a foreign state’s preferred policy positions. 
Russian influence in Eastern Europe is a prime example.     
This thesis will rely heavily on quantitative data from global surveys that track 
voter’s perceptions of elected leader’s legitimacy and their views of national partisanship 
politics in democratic countries. The thesis compares the voter’s perceptions of elected 
leader’s legitimacy and their views of national partisanship politics, comparing results 
taken prior to alleged cyber operations designed to interfere in elections with perceptions 
after such allegations. It will also compare the data from democratic countries in which 
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there have been allegations of cyber operations used to conduct electoral interference 
with a control group of democracies. Qualitative analyses will be under taken to explain 
the data’s results. Furthermore, qualitative sources will be used to supplement the 
quantitative survey data where possible.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 This chapter reviews the existing literature surrounding cyber operations and how 
states are responding to the new challenges and opportunities they present. It also 
provides an overview which places cyber operations within the broader context of 
international relations and international humanitarian law. Further, this chapter addresses 
the surveys used to explain their significance in this paper’s findings. While chapter three 
provides specific definitions for various disputed terms such as ‘cyber-attack’ and ‘cyber 
operation’ as they will be used in this paper, the language utilized here reflects that of the 
experts and scholars being cited.    
 Discussions around cyber-attacks and cybersecurity have become increasingly 
common in a range of different forums including academic research, national security 
debates, in the media and in corporate and nonprofit organizations’ guidelines. Yet, in 
this nascent field there is little consensus on precise terminology. Ambiguous terms like 
‘cyber-attacks’ can be used to describe attacks ranging from state-sponsored, enduring 
sophisticated and multipronged campaigns against rival states to attacks in which one 
rogue actor gaining unauthorized access to a private citizen’s email account. Considering 
the disparity, it is important to begin with a compilation of existing definitions for 
cybersecurity and information security. In 2014, Robert Morgus and Tim Maurer 
compiled definitions as they are utilized by various governments, international 
organizations and research institutes.1 To illustrate this diversity, there are forty-seven 
                                                          
1 Morgus, Robert and Tim Maurer. Compilation of Existing Cybersecurity and Information Security 
Related Definitions. New America Foundation, October 2014. 
https://www.giplatform.org/sites/default/files/Compilation%20of%20Existing%20Cybersecurity%20and%
20Information%20Security%20Related%20Definition.pdf.  
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different entries for ‘cyber security’ offered by a variety of states, agencies and 
organizations often embracing multiple definitions.         
Cyber Policy and Practice 
      For those unversed in cybersecurity issues, Peter Singer and Allan Friedman’s 
work Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know offers a 
comprehensive overview of cybersecurity and many of its associated issues, including: a 
basic overview of cyberspace and security, categorization of types of cyberattacks, 
cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyberterrorism, cyberpiracy, the intersection of cyber issues 
and foreign policy as well as the institutions and bodies that govern cyberspace.2 Equally 
noteworthy, in 2013 the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) 
released its Cyber Index which offers a useful and comprehensive guide to state civilian 
policy positions and state military doctrines as well as international and regional 
organization’s positions on cyber security.3   
 In Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy, William Lynn, a 
former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense situates all the potential and theoretical 
cybersecurity threats in everyday practice. The emergence of cyber warfare has created 
an asymmetrical imbalance in which a relatively small number of determined actors can 
identify and exploit vulnerabilities in an adversary’s cyber infrastructures with a 
relatively low cost and risk.4 Further escalating this threat is the multitude of potential 
                                                          
2 Singer, Peter, and Allen Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014. pp. 35 – 62.   
3 Lewis, James A., and Götz Neuneck. “The Cyber Index: International Security Trends and Realities.” 
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, 2013. 
www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/cyber-index-2013-en-463.pdf. 
4 Lynn, William J. “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, 
no. 5, September 2010. pp. 97–108. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/20788647.  
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targets which can include: national security agencies, governmental agencies, financial 
institutions, commercial operations, transportation networks, critical infrastructure and 
power utilities. The potential impact of such cyber-attacks could range from the slow 
erosion of U.S. military preparedness and its global economic competitiveness to the 
massive loss of life and property. The article also outlines the Pentagon’s efforts to 
respond to these challenges with the creation of the U.S. Cyber Command in 2010 which 
consolidated the cyber operations of the various branches of the military under one 
unified operation.5 The Cyber Command was tasked with the security of all defense and 
military operations in cyberspace, coordinating the use of the resources dedicated to 
cyber defense and building partnerships with the U.S. intelligence agencies.6 Beyond 
greater internal coordination, the Pentagon is also leveraging the U.S. tech industries’ 
expertise to identify and address vulnerabilities in civilian cyber infrastructure.                     
International Law and Cyber Norms  
The most thorough and up-to-date examination of international law in relation to 
cyber security was produced in 2017 by the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence in a follow up edition titled the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Operations. The manual builds off the first edition which was 
released in 2013 and identifies 154 well-established legal rules as they apply to governing 
cyber operations. Reflecting the fact that cyber operations are becoming an increasingly 
common tool used by states, the first version focused on the evolving use of the most 
severe cyber operations which could invoke the use of force and right to self-defense. 
                                                          
5 Lynn, William J. “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy.” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, 
no. 5, September 2010. pp. 97–108. JSTOR. www.jstor.org/stable/20788647.  
6 Ibid. 
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The second edition prioritizes a legal analysis for less severe, day-to-day cyber operations 
and lays out a more comprehensive view of the various international and regional bodies 
that govern and deliberate on cyberspace.7 Michael Schmitt, the renowned cyber scholar 
and lead editor on the Tallinn Manual projects also contributed to the classification of 
cyber conflicts. In the 2013 article, Classification of Cyber Conflict, Schmitt uses the 
guidelines laid out in the Geneva Conventions to analyze and illustrate the different 
classifications using the 2008 international armed conflict between Georgia and Russia as 
a case study.8 This article’s most significant contribution was outlining the factors that 
elevate the significance of a cyber conflict and specifying the appropriate 
countermeasures the defending nation could employ.           
 In Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity Martha Finnemore and Duncan 
Hollis argue that despite the novelty of the cyber realm, many of factors that are critical 
in the norm development process remain the same.9 They emphasize that norms already 
exist in the form of national regulations, international laws and professional standards 
and that no one set of ‘norms’ could address the wide array of issues which affect such a 
diverse community. They argue that only a pluralistic, multi-stakeholder form of 
governance could work on a platform as diffused as the internet. By using a mixture of 
incentives, persuasion and socialization methods they assert that norms can be developed 
and change online habits. By applying the rich social science literature on norm 
                                                          
7 NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence. The Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International 
Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. Cambridge University Press, 2017. 
http://csrcl.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/csrcl/files/9781107177222_frontmatter.pdf.  
8 Schmitt, Michael, N. “Classification of Cyber Conflict.” Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 17, 
no. 2, 8 August 2012. pp. 245-260. https://academic.oup.com/jcsl/article/17/2/245/852811.   
9 Finnemore, Martha, and Duncan B. Hollis. “Constructing Norms for Global Cybersecurity.” American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 110, no. 3, July 2016. pp. 425–479. JSTOR. 
www.jstor.org/stable/10.5305/amerjintelaw.110.3.0425.  
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construction, Finnemore and Hollis tend not to see norms as an end product, but rather as 
a process and a support more for participants and different forums in the dialog 
surrounding the governance of the cyber realm.    
A 2017 publication by UNIDIR, The United Nations, Cyberspace and 
International Peace and Security: Responding to Complexity in the 21st Century, outlines 
international organization’s efforts in the normative process surrounding state behavior 
towards Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs).10  While primarily 
addressing the work of the General Assembly and the UN Group of Governmental 
Experts (GGE), the publication also looked at the role of regional organizations and 
confidence building measures to ensure stability of the ICT environment and highlighting 
where on-going sources of disagreement exist.  
 Given the range of international issues and disagreements that stem from 
cybersecurity, many experts in the field have advocated for a cyber treaty convention. 
One leading scholar, Rex Hughes, a fellow for cyber security at Cambridge University, 
wrote A Treaty for Cyber Space in 2010 to address these specific concerns.11 Hughes’ 
piece, surveying several military officials and cyber security experts, asserts that the next 
major interstate conflict is likely to begin in the cyber realm as long as there are no 
established expectations of cyber conduct nor mechanisms to deescalate a cyber 
conflict.12 The article puts forward the aspects Hughes sees as necessary for an enduring 
                                                          
10 Kavanagh, Camino. “The United Nations, Cyberspace and International Peace and Security: Responding 
to Complexity in the 21st Century.” United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 2017. 
http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-united-nations-cyberspace-and-international-peace-and-
security-en-691.pdf.  
11 Hughes, Rex. “A Treaty for Cyberspace.” International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 2, March 2010. pp. 523–541. 
https://citizenlab.ca/cybernorms2011/treaty.PDF.    
12 Ibid.  
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cyber treaty, while many are based on the Law of Armed Conflict, they are adapted to the 
cyber realm and emphasize: only targeting infrastructure with military capabilities, strict 
distinctions between military and civilian targets, nonuse of indiscriminate weapons and 
respect for the principles of perfidy, neutrality and proportionality.13   
In Cameron Brown and David Friedman’s 2014 article, entitled A Cyber Warfare 
Convention? Lessons from the Conventions on Chemical and Biological Weapons, the 
concept of a cyber treaty convention is also supported while applying additional insight 
from previously successful conventions.14 While the authors, experts in the field of arms 
control, concede that it is impossible to know how many states abandoned attempts to 
acquire biological or chemical weapons as a result of these conventions, they point to 
statistical evidence that supports their claims that the conventions had an overall impact 
on declining proliferation numbers. They also address several issues first acknowledged 
in the chemical and biological conventions that they believe would be applicable to a 
cyber convention today, such as: independent verification and enforcement regimes, 
monitoring of “dual use” technologies, and defining the scope of what is to be covered 
under the convention.15 The article also outlines various shortcomings of the previous 
conventions such as the role of non-state actors, which would benefit a cyber 
convention.16       
 
                                                          
13 Hughes, Rex. “A Treaty for Cyberspace.” International Affairs, vol. 86, no. 2, March 2010. pp. 523–541. 
https://citizenlab.ca/cybernorms2011/treaty.PDF.    
14 Brown, Cameron S., and David Friedman. “A Cyber Warfare Convention? Lessons from the 
Conventions on Chemical and Biological Weapons.” Arms Control and National Security: New Horizons. 
Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2014. pp. 45–63. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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Informational Warfare and Cyber Aggression 
 While this thesis seeks to uncover any and all alleged attempts to disrupt, alter or 
influence the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated cyber campaigns, 
Russian prolific and aggressive use of these new tactics has earned it the greatest scrutiny 
from rival militaries, intelligence agencies, and governments as well as cyber experts and 
increasingly academics. The most comprehensive overview of how Russia has been 
utilizing cyberwarfare to further its foreign policy agenda was produced by the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in January, 2018. The report, Putin’s Asymmetric 
Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, 
offers a detailed examination of how Russian President Vladimir Putin ascended to power 
and how he adapted Soviet-era KGB techniques such as ‘active measures’ and ‘malign 
influence operations’ to the modern era.  In the process, he turned Moscow’s Federal 
Security Services (FSB) into an extremely effective intelligence agency.17 According to 
the report, Putin used techniques such as staging disinformation campaigns against 
adversaries, cultivating political extremist groups, and weaponizing both information and 
energy supplies all with the goal of gaining leverage over adversaries.18 Once Putin had 
perfected these methods on his domestic opposition, he began to employ them abroad to 
advance his foreign policy goals. The report builds an in-depth chronology tracking these 
Russian attempts to disrupt and manipulate international rivals from Russia’s near 
abroad, in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, to its attempts in Western Europe and the 
                                                          
17 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and 
Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security (S.Prt.115-21). Report. 10 January 2018. 115th Cong. 2nd 
sess. Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2018. (S.Prt.115-21). 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.   
18 Ibid. 
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U.S.19 The report concludes with expert analysis on the methods of attack which proved 
most effective and recommendations on how such efforts can be undermined when 
Russia attempts to use them again.20       
 Yet, the U.S. is not alone in recognizing this new threat. In fact, many European 
nations have suffered such attacks and have been attempting to address the problem for 
months and years. The use of what many experts are calling “hybrid warfare” – a mixture 
of conventional warfare supported by cyber aggression and disinformation campaigns -  
in Russia’s assault on eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea served as a wakeup call 
for European militaries and intelligence agencies.21 In a NATO report, The Next Phase of 
Russian Information Warfare, Keir Giles, a leading Russian scholar at Chatham House, 
analyzes how Russia will likely work to further integrate its cyber capabilities with its 
conventional arms to devastating effect. Giles also outlines what NATO members are 
doing to mitigate the effects and offers recommendations to help further those efforts.22    
Polling Surveys & Data Collected  
One of the primary data sources used in this thesis comes from Gallup Inc. in the 
form of their annual World Poll and the U.S. Daily surveys. Gallup’s methodology aims 
to collect data representative of the civilian population ages 15 and older by conducting 
approximately 1,000 interviews in the respondent’s native language. With over 150 
                                                          
19 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and 
Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security (S.Prt.115-21). Report. 10 January 2018. 115th Cong. 2nd 
sess. Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2018. (S.Prt.115-21). 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.   
20 Ibid. 
21 Giles, Keir. “The Next Phase of Russian Information Warfare.” NATO Strategic Communications Centre 
of Excellence, 2017. www.stratcomcoe.org/next-phase-russian-information-warfare-keir-giles.  
22 Ibid. 
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countries included in the survey, Gallup conducts its interviews by phone in countries 
where telephone coverage extends to at least 80% of the population while conducting 
face-to-face interviews to maintain accurate national representation in countries which 
this standard is not meet.23 Interview questions range in topic but inquire about the 
respondent’s view of minorities and immigrants, freedom of the media, internet access, 
economic conditions, global leaders, national leaders, corruption in business, corruption 
in institutions, corruption in elected leaders as well as election integrity. The data 
collected for this paper includes worldwide national aggregates for this data from 2006 to 
2017 as well as national data broken down by annual income, educational attainment, age 
and the urban-rural divide for nations hailing from NATO, the former-USSR and any 
European nation not included in the former categories. The same polling data was also 
collected on a sub-national, state-by-state basis in the United States.  
 Another crucial source of information collected for this thesis comes from 
Edelman, a consultancy firm which has produced the annual Edelman Trust Barometer 
since 2001. Edelman’s methodology includes collecting polling data from 28 countries 
via online surveys. Their data is broken into two categories: the ‘Mass Population’ which 
is collected from 1,150 respondents (ages18 years and older) per country which 
represents 85% of those polled and an ‘Informed Public’ which is collected from at least 
200 respondents per country and represents 15% of those polled.24 In addition, the 
‘Informed Public’ must meet four criteria including: those who fall within the age range 
of 25 – 64, be college-educated, represent the top 25% of household income per age 
                                                          
23 “How Does Gallup’s Global Poking Work?” Gallup.com. www.news.gallup.com/poll/128189/Gallup-
global-polling-work.aspx. 
24 “2018 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report.” Edelman Trust Barometer 2018 Annual Global Study, 
Edelman. www.edelman.com/trust-barometer.  
16 
 
group in each country and report significant media consumption and engagement in 
business news and public policy.25 The data is collected from more than 33,000 
respondents globally and fields questions about a respondent’s trust in institutions 
including: specific industries and sectors of the economy as well as the business 
community at large, the media, NGOs and national governments. Furthermore, the survey 
asks additional questions for each institution in an attempt to understand the factors that 
have an impact on the population’s trust in a specific institution.26        
 The final survey included here comes from the Pew Research Center which has 
produced its annual Global Attitudes Survey in 91 countries since 2014. Pew’s 
methodology employs both face-to-face (when necessary to attain a representative 
national survey) and phone interviews in the native language with an average of 1,000 
respondents per country.27 While the Global Attitudes Survey asks many questions 
regarding the respondent’s economic outlook and view on global trends, it also offers 
insight on a respondent’s attitudes towards global organizations and institutions, various 
world leaders and the countries they represent.28    
Building a Comprehensive View  
Together these sources help to build a more complete picture of the threat posed 
by cyber aggression and help illustrate the effects it has on government and their citizens. 
This thesis contributes to the debate by adding structure to the opaque field of cyber 
                                                          
25 “2018 Edelman Trust Barometer Global Report.” Edelman Trust Barometer 2018 Annual Global Study, 
Edelman. www.edelman.com/trust-barometer. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Wormald, Benjamin. “International Survey Methodology.” Pew Research Center, 26 June 2017. 
www.pewresearch.org/methodology/international-survey-research/international-methodology/global-
attitudes-survey/all-country/all-year.  
28 Ibid. 
17 
 
aggression and defense. It brings clarity by indexing the different methods and tactics that 
have been used against democratic states’ governments, political parties, individual 
political actors, electorates at large and of course their electoral processes. Separately, the 
sources provide alarming but disparate aspects of the threat from cyber aggression. Yet 
when viewed comprehensively as different aspects of a multipronged assault on 
democratic institutions globally, they establish an urgent need for a collective and 
proactive response from all those who value democratic governance.  
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Chapter Three: Overcoming Definitional Fog  
 In order to properly situate this thesis within the wider conversation surrounding 
cybersecurity, it is necessary to establish definitions and clarify concepts as they are to be 
used within this context. For organizational purposes, the definitions and concepts will be 
broken into two categories: intelligence operations and cyber aggression and security. 
This distinction will help to show how many of the modern techniques for cyber 
aggression and defense have been adapted as yet another set of tools, albeit very effective 
tools, used within the larger context of intelligence operations. For terms or concepts that 
have multiple definitions, this thesis uses the most applicable or widespread usage.     
Intelligence Operations 
 One of the keys to understanding how states, and in particular Russia, have taken 
advantage of cyberspace requires an understanding of the intelligence agencies which 
have been making use of the new technologies. The so-called Gerasimov Doctrine and 
the concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ both explain why Russia and others following Russia’s 
lead have embraced cyber technology so thoroughly.29 Andrew Monaghan writing for the 
US Army War College in 2016 provided a definition for hybrid warfare which outlines 
the concept in great detail. Hybrid warfare exists “between war and peace” and makes 
use of “Russian asymmetric challenges such as economic manipulation, an extensive and 
powerful disinformation and propaganda campaign, the fostering of civil disobedience 
and even insurrection and the use of well-supplied paramilitaries. In sum, Russian hybrid 
                                                          
29 Galeotti, Mark. “The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War.” In Moscow's Shadows, 6 July 
2014. www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-
linear-war/.   
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warfare as widely understood in the West represents a method of operating that relies on 
proxies and surrogates to prevent attribution and intent, and to maximize confusion and 
uncertainty. Conventional force is often obliquely mentioned as a supplementary feature, 
but the main feature of hybrid warfare is that it remains below the threshold of the clear 
use of armed force. Hybrid warfare is thus tantamount to a range of hostile actions of 
which “military force is only a small part, or ‘measures short of war’ that seek to deceive, 
undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize societies, to coerce or replace sovereign 
governments and to disrupt or alter an existing regional order.”30 This definition of hybrid 
warfare is the essence of the Gerasimov Doctrine, a phrase first used in an article 
published in Voenno-promyshlennyi kur’er, the Military-Industrial Courier in 2014 by 
Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov and illustrates how deeply this 
concept is embedded within the Russian leadership.31 However, as some scholars have 
found issues with attributing the doctrine to Gerasimov and even that it constitutes a 
doctrine, this thesis will mark use of Monaghan’s widely accepted definition of hybrid 
warfare.32    
  Within Monaghan’s definition of hybrid warfare, he describes the use of 
asymmetric challenges to deceive, undermine, subvert, influence and destabilize 
societies, to coerce or replace sovereign governments and to disrupt or alter an existing 
regional order. Monaghan is describing what Russian and Soviet intelligence officers 
called Aktivinyye meropriatia, or active measures. Writing extensively on the history of 
                                                          
30 Monaghan, Andrew. “The ‘War’ in Russia’s ‘Hybrid Warfare’.” Parameters, The US Army War 
College, 2016. http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2015-16/9_Monaghan.pdf.   
31 Galeotti, Mark. “The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War.” In Moscow's Shadows, 6 July 
2014. www.inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-
linear-war/. 
32 Ibid. 
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the Soviet Union and its intelligence services, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy 
Bezopasnosti (KGB), Chiristopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin describe active 
measures developing alongside the agency which was established in 1954.33 Andrew and 
Mitrokhin leave the definition as broad as possible, considering the malleable nature of 
active measures, defining them as Soviet efforts “to influence the course of world events” 
with operations ranging from media manipulation to various degrees of violence. While 
the thesis will use this broader definition, more recent attempts to define the concept 
include individual operations includes: propaganda, media manipulation, political 
influence, disinformation, deception, use of forgery, funding of extremist and opposition 
groups, spreading conspiracy theories and rumor, cyber-attacks, espionage and 
assassination.34 While the broader definition offered by Andrew and Mitrokhin is better 
suited for active measures’ adaptable nature, these operations all fall under the larger 
umbrella of active measures and offer clarity on what can be described as an active 
measure operation.  
 Martin Libicki, a prominent cybersecurity expert working for RAND Corporation, 
noted the difficulty with another equally important concept, information warfare. In 2007, 
he wrote “that well over a decade after the topic of information warfare broke out into the 
open, its conceptual underpinnings remain weak and largely unsatisfactory, with fierce 
battles raging over neologisms and definitions.”35 Considering the definitional variations 
                                                          
33 Andrew, Christopher M., and Vasili Mitrokhin. The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and 
the Secret History of the KGB. Penguin Press, 1999. https://archive.org/details/TheSwordAndTheShield-
TheMitrokhinArchiveAndTheSecretHistoryOfTheKGB. 
34 Sipher, John. “Russian Active Measures and the 2016 Election Hack.” The Cipher Brief, 20 December 
2017. www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/russian-active-measures-2016-election-hack.  
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for information warfare, this thesis contextualizes it as a component of hybrid warfare 
and conducted through the use of active measures. M.M. Taraskin and S.A. Cheshuin, 
who both contributed to Russia’s National Security Concept of the Russian Federation 
adopted in 1999, wrote an article in 2009 for the journal, Vestnik Akademii Voyennykh 
Nauk (Bulletin of the Academy of Military Sciences) which described information 
warfare.36 The authors define information warfare as a “struggle in the information 
sphere to impact the opposing side’s information objects and protect one’s own 
information objects from such impact.”37 They continue to make an important distinction, 
noting that information warfare includes, “all the means and methods of impacting 
information, information-psychological, and information-technological objects and 
information resources to achieve the objectives of the attacking side.”38 The distinction 
between information-psychological and information-technical can be explained as the use 
of the media to impact the consciousness of individuals and groups as opposed to the use 
of software and communication technologies to disrupt mass media as well as military 
and civilian information networks.39  
 Malign influence operations or simply influence operations, are another type of 
active measure that is crucial to understanding attempts to disrupt or influence elections 
but suffers from definitional ambiguity. An in-depth examination conducted by a team of 
researchers from the RAND Corporation in 2009 provides the most inclusive definition 
which again is beneficial given active measures adaptive nature. They described 
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influence operations as “the coordinated, integrated, and synchronized application of 
national diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and other capabilities in 
peacetime, crisis, conflict, and post-conflict to foster attitudes, behaviours, (sic) or 
decisions by foreign target audiences that further [a nation’s] interests and objectives.”40 
Given this wide spectrum within influence operations, it is also clarifying to establish the 
different types of propaganda used to advance the operation. In Propaganda and 
Persuasion, Garth Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell outline propagandas severity based on 
color. They describe white propaganda as coming from a “source that is identified 
correctly, and the information in the message tends to be accurate…Although what 
listeners hear is reasonably close to the truth, it is presented in a manner that attempts to 
convince the audience that the sender is the ‘good guy’ with the best ideas and political 
ideology.”41 While black propaganda also known as disinformation is described as 
“credited to a false source, and it spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions.”42 Falling in 
between those extremes exists gray propaganda, in which “the source may or may not be 
correctly identified, and the accuracy of information is uncertain.”43 
 Given the long history of intelligence operations, difficulties with definitions can 
arise for a variety of reasons, including translation issues and imprecision by those in the 
media.  With these definitions describing various aspects of intelligence operations firmly 
established, it is possible to pivot to cyber aggression and security which have become an 
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integral part of modern intelligence operations. Yet, here too, definitional imprecision has 
led to a lack of clarity on the part of the public which is only slowly being reversed as 
cybersecurity becomes a more common concern for society.       
Cyber Aggression & Security  
 The most basic definitions set the perimeters of the discussion on cyber issues. 
“Cyberspace” as was recognized in the 2014 Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms is “a global domain within the information environment 
consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and 
resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, 
and embedded processors and controllers.”44 While a “cyber-attack” is understood by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology as “an attack, via cyberspace, targeting an 
enterprise’s use of cyberspace for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying, or 
maliciously controlling a computing environment/infrastructure; or destroying the 
integrity of the data or stealing controlled information.”45 This definition of cyber-attack 
proves most relevant as it accounts for the increasing nuance of cyber-attacks and does 
not exclude the possibility of maliciously controlling or destroying controlled information 
as a form of attack.   
Yet, even with this inclusive definition of cyber-attacks, it is noteworthy that 
many international security organizations, NATO included, are moving towards the more 
common use of cyber operations. As NATO’s Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
                                                          
44 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 
Washington DC: March 2018. http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf.  
45 U.S. Department of Commerce. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Glossary of Key 
Information Security Terms. Washington DC: 2013. 
http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2013/NIST.IR.7298r2.pdf. 
24 
 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare published in 2013 indicates, cyber operations are “the 
employment of cyber capabilities with the primary purpose of achieving objectives in or 
by the use of cyberspace.”46 This increasing preference for describing actions as cyber 
operations rather than cyber-attacks is an indication of cyber operation’s increasing 
complexity. Part of that complexity, is related to the rise of “internet trolls” or just 
“trolls” who are responsible for cyber operations. An internet troll in its most benevolent 
form can be “a person who posts incendiary comments with the express purpose of 
provoking an argument.”47 NATO’s StratCom Centre of Excellence researchers have 
created a new term, the “hybrid troll,” to acknowledge the trolls which operate as “hired, 
pro-Russian trolls, communicate a particular ideology and, most importantly, operate 
under the direction and orders of a particular state or state institution.”48 The researchers 
claim while a standard troll has “no apparent instrumental purpose,” “the aim of hybrid 
trolls has been to promote the Kremlin’s interests and portray Russia as a positive force 
against the ‘rotten West’ and the US hegemony.”49     
These hybrid trolls are also extremely well equipped. One of the tools at their 
disposal is what is known as “automated internet bots” or “bots”, and in particular, one 
class of internet bot known as the “Socialbot.” Techopedia offers a concise definition for 
internet bot as “software that performs an automated task over the Internet. More 
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specifically, a bot is an automated application used to perform simple and repetitive tasks 
that would be time-consuming, mundane or impossible for a human to perform.”50  For 
socialbots, Techopedia offers a more fulsome definition, which is indicative of the 
controversy socialbots cause within the tech industry, it describes them as: 
A type of bot that controls a social media account. Like all bots, a 
socialbot is automated software. The exact way a socialbot replicates 
depends on the social network, but unlike a regular bot, a socialbot spreads 
by convincing other users that the socialbot is a real person. If not 
malicious, most would at least argue that socialbots are unethical.  
After all, their whole point of social networking is for actual 
humans to connect. Whether or not a socialbot actually steals data or is 
just done for amusement of the creator, the fact of the matter is that a 
socialbot needs to trick a real user in order to spread. … Socialbots are 
most common in Twitter, though there also have been experiments with 
Facebook bots. Given the design of Twitter with short messages, re-
tweeting, following etc., it's actually not too difficult for a socialbot to 
appear human. Identity theft is a huge concern with socialbots, but what 
really differs from other forms of malware is the trust factor that exists in 
social networks. This can serve to help the socialbot spread, but also 
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brings up questions as to whether a botnet of socialbots could influence 
external events.”51  
To add to their effectiveness, hybrid trolls will also employ large 
numbers of socialbots in what is called a “botnet.” Techopedia again offer 
a succinct definition, describing botnets as “a group of computers 
connected in a coordinated fashion for malicious purposes. … These bots 
form a network of compromised computers, which is controlled by a third 
party and used to transmit malware or spam, or to launch attacks.52 
 Hybrid trolls, working under the direction of a state, are often, reportedly, 
organized into teams and provided with work space and schedules to maximize their 
efficiency.53 While sources are incredibly difficult to come by as no nation is willing to 
confirm the existence of clandestine cyber operation facilities, journalists working for the 
Russian independent newsmagazine RBC were able to uncover details through a sting 
operation. Polina Rusyaeva, Andrey Zakharov, and Ludmila Savchuk gained employment 
at what has been described as the Internet Research Agency in St. Petersburg Russia and 
shared the details of the experience with Western journalists to further promote their 
discoveries.54 The journalists claim that the agency employed up to 400 hybrid trolls and 
enjoyed a monthly budget of at least 20 million rubles (approximately $400,000) a 
month.55 Their accounts offer intimate details and if credible confirm many of the details 
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offered by security firms and intelligence agencies about Russia’s state-sponsored cyber 
operations.       
 Recognizing the growing role of cyber operations as a critical aspect within 
influence operations, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence COE researchers coined the 
term “influence cyber operations (ICO).” They define ICOs as “encompass activities 
undertaken in cyberspace affecting the logical layer of cyberspace with the intention of 
influencing attitudes, behaviours, or decisions of target audiences.”56 Some of the 
verifiable methods used to accomplish these ICOs is documented by TrendMicros, 
SecureWorks and Microsoft and addressed in following chapters include structured query 
language (SQL) injections, spear-phishing emails, distributed denial-of-service attacks, 
data dumps (or political doxing) and astroturfing. As not all these methods are commonly 
known, they will be defined to ensure clarity in future chapters. SQL injections and 
spear-phishing emails are methods to gain unauthorized access to a target’s database. An 
SQL injection occurs when an “attacker can execute malicious SQL statements (also 
commonly referred to as a malicious payload) that control a web application’s database 
server,”57 and represents one of the most common ways malicious actors gain access to a 
private database. Similarly, a spear-phishing email grants perpetrators access to the 
target’s private database through the use of “fraudulent emails, containing malicious 
code, target specific organizations in an effort to gain access to confidential 
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information.”58 A denial-of-service attack often requires the use of botnets but uses brute 
force to “make an online service unavailable by overwhelming it with traffic from 
multiple sources.”59 The remaining methods, data dumps (or political doxing) and 
astroturfing make use of stolen and controversial information or disinformation to further 
the ICO’s objective. A data dump, which has also been described as a form of doxing, 
entails the release of potentially stolen information at a time when it is determined to 
have the greatest repercussions on the victim.60 While astroturfing, playing of the concept 
of grass root organizations, attempts to supporting a divisive group or causes through the 
use of botnets and hybrid trolls.61    
 Together, these sections offer a comprehensive overview of terms related to 
intelligence operations and cyber aggression and security which are relevant for the 
following chapters. Unfortunately, both the fields of intelligence and cyber security are 
complex and the precise meaning of a term or phrase can be diluted when used 
improperly by the broader public. By providing the definitions and the reasoning behind 
why certain definitions were chosen, this chapter offers greater clarity and specificity on 
subjects which have remained opaque to the wider public.       
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Chapter Four: Types of Cyber Operations 
While this thesis broadly identifies the role of cyber operations in disrupting and 
influencing elections in democratic states, the common denominator in these cyber 
operations has been the Russian Federation. Due to limitations in publicly available 
information, this thesis does not attempt to attribute specific operations against 
democratic states’ elections to Russia. However, given the depth of literature and data 
documenting Russian involvement, a great deal of clarity on the different types of cyber 
operations can be gained by examining verifiable Russian cyber operations meant to 
disrupt or influence elections in the U.S. and Europe.    
 Testifying before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee hearing on Russian 
interference in the U.S. 2016 presidential election, former Director of National 
Intelligence, James Clapper Jr. provided the lawmakers present with the collective 
assessment of the FBI, CIA and NSA. Clapper explained “that the Russian government 
pursued a multifaceted influence campaign in the run-up to the election, including 
aggressive use of cyber capabilities.”62 Later in the hearing, in response to an assertion by 
Senator John Kennedy of Louisiana that the Russians had been running these types of 
campaigns for years, Clapper rejected the assertion, indicating that “this is unprecedented 
in terms of its aggressiveness and the multifaceted campaign.”63 Likewise, in a statement 
prepared for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 2017, Director of 
NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, Janis Sarts explained how new 
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technological developments made these cyber operations attractive because they were 
increasingly fast, cheap, and geographically unlimited.64 Director Sarts, further supported 
this point by putting forward a chronology of cyber operations which targeted European 
elections as documented by NATO StratCom COE including efforts in: Estonia in 2009, 
Ukraine in 2014, Germany in 2015, Montenegro in 2016, and the Netherlands, Norway 
and France in 2017.65   
A crucial element in understanding cyber operations and why they prove effective 
is related to the actual perpetrator of the operation. These perpetrators of cyber 
operations, or trolls as they’re know in cyber security parlance, can operate from any 
nondescript location with an internet connection, are relatively inexpensive to employ 
and do not require extensive investment to maximize their cyber capabilities.66 Despite 
claims from the Kremlin denying any state involvement in cyber operations targeting 
other country’s domestic elections, there is mounting evidence that indicates the 
existence of Russian state-sponsored facilities designed to conduct cyber operations on a 
massive level.67 The activities of Russian-sponsored cyber operation facilities, or troll 
farms again as they’re referred to in cyber security parlance, has been documented and 
tracked by several European intelligence agencies, including the United Kingdom’s 
House of Commons Defence Committee, Czech Republic’s Security Information Service 
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(BIS), Estonia’s Kaitsepolitseiamet (Estonian Intelligence Services) and Sweden’s 
Sakerhetspolisen (Swedish Security Services) for the past several year. 68697071 
One of the most authoritative and thorough source of information on the existence 
of these Kremlin-sponsored facilities comes from the U.S. Special Council investigation 
of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections led by Robert Mueller III. In a recent 
indictment, Mueller’s team charged the Russian organization, the Internet Research 
Agency LLC, and thirteen Russians affiliated with the organization for having 
“knowingly and intentionally conspired … to defraud the United States by impairing, 
obstructing and defeating the lawful functions of the government through fraud and 
deceit for the purpose of interfering with the U.S. political and electoral processes, 
including the presidential election of 2016.”72 The indictment goes into granular detail, 
outlining the agency’s organizational structure, protocols, budget and its work in the 
creation of false American personas, social media accounts, groups and events.73 And 
while it’s important to remember that an indictment is only a formal accusation brought 
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about by a federal prosecutor, the incredible specificity of the charges in the indictment 
indicate the underlying sources were provided by cooperative U.S. intelligence agencies.     
 As new details and sources on the methods used to interfere in the U.S. 2016 
presidential election emerge, former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper’s 
choice of the phrase “multifaceted campaign” appears exceedingly appropriate. To 
organize the different types of cyber operations utilized to interfere in elections, it is 
clarifying to establish the types of cyber operations based on their intended targets. With 
currently available public information, it’s possible to create three categories of 
operations: cyber operations which targeted voting equipment and election infrastructure, 
cyber operations which targeted elected officials, political operatives and political parties 
and cyber operations which targeted the public. The following details the specific 
operations which fall in each category.  
Targeting Voting Equipment and Election Infrastructure 
 As it has been seen elsewhere, the available public data on intrusions into voting 
equipment and its online infrastructure is limited but becoming increasingly available 
through the declassification of information. It is reasonable that few nations want to 
provide details of the vulnerabilities that exist within their electoral infrastructure and 
voter registration databanks. However, it is noteworthy that this method of compromising 
the physical election hardware does not seem to be the preferred method as it is detectible 
and not as effective as other methods yet to be discussed.  
 In the U.S. there have been several sources which implicate Russian actors in the 
probing of US election-related infrastructure and voter registration systems across various 
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states. The Acting Deputy Undersecretary for Cybersecurity and Communications at the 
DHS, Jeanette Manfra claimed the nation’s cyber systems are under constant attack, 
indicating the DHS had evidence of cyber-enabled scanning and probing of election 
related infrastructure originating from servers operated by Russian company.74 In 
testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Manfra continued to describe 
unclassified FBI material which gave specific details regarding a cyber-attack in July 
2016 that resulted in a State Board of Elections website being compromised.75  
That FBI material, originally classified because it contained actionable IP 
addresses, was a flash warning issued by the FBI Cyber Division to all the states’ Board 
of Elections. In the bulletin, the FBI warns of two cyber-attacks in July and August 2016 
against unnamed (but since identified as Arizona76 and Illinois77) states’ Board of 
Election websites.78 The bulletin offers the following technical details: 
   In late June 2016, an unknown actor scanned a state's Board of 
Election website for vulnerabilities using Acunetix, and after identifying a 
Structured Query Language (SQL) injection (SQLi) vulnerability, used 
SQLmap to target the state website. The majority of the data exfiltration 
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occurred in mid-July. There were seven suspicious IPs and penetration 
testing tools Acunetix, SQLMap, and DirBuster used by the actor.79 
The Structured Query Language (SLQ), as a reminder, is “computer language 
designed for eliciting information from databases.” 80 While the SLQ Injection (SLQI) is 
the process of finding vulnerabilities in the SLQ and inserting malicious code giving the 
user the ability to tamper with the existing data across the database, in this case, the 
databases maintained by both Arizona and Illinois’s Board of Election.81 It’s also helpful 
to understand that the tools, Acunetix, SQLMap, and DirBuster are commonly used 
opensource web tools. They can be used to access and manage a database’s SQL, exploit 
the vulnerabilities within that database and insert malicious SQLIs, and map that 
database’s structure, directories and files, respectively.828384 Equally important, all seven 
of the listed IP address in the bulletin have been independently identified and flagged as 
associated with Russian government cyber actors and Russian malicious cyber activity by 
the DHS’s U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT).85 The most crucial 
piece of information being the data exfiltration, which in an open letter to the state 
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Election Authorities the Director of Voting and Registration Systems for Illinois State 
Board of Elections, Kyle Thomas, identified as an unknown amount of voter records.86  
 In various European elections as well, there is evidence of successful attempts to 
compromise election infrastructure. One of the first well documented cyber-attacks in 
Europe occurred in 2014 prior to the Ukrainian national elections and also serves as a 
perfect example of what military experts have called hybrid warfare.87 The context of the 
attack is critical. On November 21st, 2013, Ukrainian Pro-Russian President Viktor 
Yanukovych suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement 
with the European Union which sparked escalating protests across the country.88 By 
February, 24th, 2014, 84 Ukrainians had died in the protests, a new interim president was 
named in Kiev, new presidential elections were scheduled for May and most importantly 
Yanukovych had fled to escape a warrant for his arrest over his involvement in the death 
of the protesters.89 Almost simultaneously as Yanukovych went into hiding, unrest and 
conflict fueled by allegedly pro-Russian separatists began to spread in Crimea and the 
eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk.9091 These alleged pro-Russian Ukrainian 
separatists forces which were later identified as partially composed of and heavily 
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supported by the Russian Armed Forces, dragged the country into a prolonged, violent 
conflict.92 By the time of the presidential elections in May the country was in chaos.  
In this tumultuous atmosphere, an online group known as “CyberBerkut,” named 
after the riot police unit which had been accused of brutality against protesters at the 
onset of the unrest, began probing the Ukrainian Central Election Commission (CEC). 93 
The attacks intended target was the election analytics system that aggregates voter data94. 
While the technical details of the attack are scant, Volodymyr Zverev, Head of the State 
Service for Special Communication and Information Security, told Ukrainian reports that 
a virus had destroyed all of the internal data of the CEC on May 22.95 In the aftermath of 
the attack it was discovered that in the attack, just three days prior to the election, 
CyberBerkut had infiltrated the CEC’s election infrastructure, disabled the election 
analytics system and released the details of the analytic system and personal contact 
information from the election committee staff.96 While the CEC’s data had been backed 
up earlier in the day, preventing the intended delay in election results, the attack stands as 
one of the most brazen attempts to disrupt elections through the election infrastructure.97       
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 Similar attempts have been uncovered in other European capitals as well, in 
particular Amsterdam. In the run up to the Netherlands’ 2017 general election, Foreign 
Affairs Minister Bert Koenders warned that the Dutch General Intelligence and Security 
Services (AIVD) were on the highest alert for cyber intrusion in the election.98 In fact, the 
AIVD warned that “the Netherlands’ Highly developed ICT infrastructure makes our 
nation an attractive channel for cyber-attacks.”99 Ultimately, after Minister of Home 
Affairs Ronald Plasterk, issued a warning that there had been international indications 
that the Russians were probing the elections, the government decided the prudent 
decision was to forgo the electronic system and use traditional paper and pen methods.100   
 As it has been seen in these accounts, there are several weaknesses in targeting 
the physical election infrastructure and voter registration databases. Primarily, country’s 
intelligence agencies are constantly searching for these types of intrusions and they leave 
a clear trail back to the perpetrator. As it will be seen in the following section, unlike 
cyber operations that simply attempt to alter or interfere with the physical election 
infrastructure, other types of cyber operations have proven more effective in influencing 
elections’ outcomes and are better suited to take advantage of democratic societies’ 
internal divisions.    
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Targeting Elected Officials, Political Operatives and Political Parties 
 Cyber operations which target elected officials or candidates, their staffs, political 
operatives and political parties, due to the outcry of the victims of such operations, are 
often the most publicized. While there have been a number of extremely high-profile 
examples, notably in the U.S. and France, which fall within this type of operation, they 
have also been used to great effect in Eastern Europe while avoiding excessive 
international scrutiny. These operations are also often potent because there is frequently a 
domestic constituency which finds the operation advantageous to its own objectives.  
 The most infamous instance of a cyber operation used against a political target 
with the objective of disrupting or influencing an election occurred during the U.S. 2016 
presidential election. The intense debate and scrutiny over this occurrence has also led to 
a significant amounts of intelligence information being released to the public which has 
served to inform this thesis. On January 6th, 2017, the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence issued a comprehensive joint report in collaboration with the CIA, NSA and 
FBI entitled “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections” to the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. As indicated in the title, this report offered the 
agencies’ collective assessment on Russia’s involvement in the 2016 U.S. elections but 
also revealed the granular details of the Russian cyber operations.  
 The assessment indicated that in the early stages of the operation, “Russia’s 
intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political 
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parties.”101 This point suggests that in the earliest stages the operation was intended to 
cause disruption to the election process, rather than assist any one candidate. The report 
continues to name the Russian intelligence agency, the General Staff Main Intelligence 
Directorate (GRU) as one of the main actors in the cyber operation and outlines its broad 
efforts to collect information from “US primary campaigns, think tanks and lobbying 
groups they viewed as likely to shape future US policies.”102 The assessment claims that 
the GRU had gained access to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) networks from 
July, 2015 to June, 2016 through the use of personal email accounts of Democratic Party 
officials and political figures and that by May they had used this access to exfiltrate large 
volumes of data.103  The cyber security company, Secureworks, was able to track the 
attack back to Russia intelligence affiliated IP addresses with moderate confidence.104 
Securework’s Counter Threat Unit analyzed 3,907 individual Gmail accounts and 
corporate and organizational email accounts that use Gmail as a service associated with 
the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and determined that the perpetrators used what is 
known as a spear-phishing attack to gain entry to the DNC’s networks.105 The attack 
involves sending deceptive emails to higher level staff members, prompting the victim to 
enter security information to resolve a fictitious issue, upon providing the security 
information the perpetrator gains access to the network. The Counter Threat Unit also 
uncovered similar efforts associated with Germany’s Prime Minister Angela Merkel and 
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rival candidates Donald Trump, Bernie Sanders, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John Kasich 
which again strongly indicates that the purpose of these operations was to disrupt the 
election process.106 
 A similar operation took place during the 2017 French presidential election. 
Context is quite important here. On the far-right, The Front National’s (FN) candidate 
Marine Le Pen held a consolatory position on Russia.107 A Eurosceptic and ultra-
nationalist, Le Pen had defended Russian action in Ukraine and Syria and called for a 
“balanced” relationship between Russia and Western powers.108 While Emmanuel 
Macron, considered a political centrist, held pro-EU views and had been supportive of the 
EU sanctions placed on Russia over its aggression in eastern Ukraine.109 According to an 
assessment report conducted in the aftermath of the operation by TrendMicro, a cyber 
defense company, candidate Macron and his political party, La République En March!, 
were targeted in cyber operations.110 The report describes similar methods as used in the 
cyber operation that targeted the DNC, including the use of spear-phishing attacks against 
higher level staff members to gain access to private information within the campaign’s 
database.111 While the perpetrators were operating under a different moniker, 
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PawnStorm, TrendMicro has claimed with fair confidence that the attack can be traced 
back to Russian GRU affiliated IP addresses.112   
The assessment which was released in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. election, 
indicated that “The Kremlin’s campaign aimed at the US election featured disclosures of 
data obtained through Russian cyber operations; intrusions into US state and local 
electoral boards; and overt propaganda. Russian intelligence collection both informed and 
enabled the influence campaign.”113 That final sentence is critical to understand how the 
stolen data was then weaponized and used against the political organization from which it 
was stolen. It also serves as a segue into the next the next type of cyber operation.   
Targeting the Public 
 Evidence of cyber operations conducted against the broader public in an effort to 
interfere in elections is becoming increasingly available. These types of cyber operations 
are designed to influence the voting population and promote the most extreme views 
within a society. In 2016, Pascal Brangetto and Matthijs Veenendaal of the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, proposed the term “Influence Cyber 
Operations” (ICOs) for this new type of operation which adapted elements of influence 
operations, a tool used by international intelligence services for decades, and integrated 
them with emerged cyber operations.114 The advent of “cyberspace offers numerous 
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possibilities for these kinds of coercive operations, which are designed to influence a 
target audience by changing, compromising, destroying, or stealing information by 
accessing information systems and networks.”115 Keir Giles, a senior fellow of the Russia 
and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, specifies three ways ICOs prove effective: by 
“both internally and externally focus[ing] media with a substantial online presence,” by 
“target audiences on a broad front in their own language” and also by “use of social 
media and online fora as a force multiplier to ensure Russian narratives achieve broad 
reach and penetration.”116  
 One tool which acts as a force multiplier and amplifies the effect of ICOs is the 
social bot.117 While social bots operate in a definitional fog, this thesis uses a definition 
which focuses on certain qualifying aspects of the computer algorithm. These aspects 
include: the program can be fully automated as well as partly controlled by human action, 
autonomous agent-like action, an orientation toward a goal, can operate on multiple 
modes of communication, and operates in a wider social media ecosystem.118  In a written 
response to questioning by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Facebook’s 
Vice President and General Counsel Colin Stretch claimed that “in October 2016, for 
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example, we disabled about 5.8 million fake accounts in the United States”119 adding, “At 
the time, our automated tooling did not yet reflect our knowledge of fake accounts 
focused on social or political issues.”120 An admission, which as Senator Mark Warner 
pointed out, could mean the numbers initially reported only account for a fraction of the 
actual number of fake accounts.121  Stretch further claimed that learning from the US 
election led to the detection of bots being used in European elections. He indicated that in 
advance of the 2017 French presidential elections more than 30,000 accounts had been 
exposed while prior to the 2017 German federal elections “tens of thousands” of accounts 
had been uncovered.122 The report also noted while Facebook has been working 
fastidiously to remove fraudulent accounts, it continued to uncover them on a daily 
basis.123  
Stretch also advised the lawmakers to examine the techniques used to amplify 
divisive messages as outlined in the white papers on information operations released in 
April, 2017. In its findings Facebook admitted that social bots were a tool utilized by 
individuals, and as Facebook claims, Russian-linked accounts, to further advance 
information operations on the platform.124 Facebook asserts that these accounts used 
social bots to amplify their reach by: the masse creation of fake accounts, coordinated 
sharing and reposting of content across multiple pages, coordinated and repeated 
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commenting sometimes in a harassing manner, coordinated “likes” or reactions, 
coordinated astroturfing of groups, creation of groups and pages with the specific intent 
to spread sensational and bias headlines which often distorted facts and creations and 
distribution of inflammatory and occasionally racist memes, manipulated photos and 
video content.125 One of the most important findings, was the realization that while these 
social bots can act entirely autonomously, they were more frequently used to promote and 
amplify the content of a specific account which indicates that individual hybrid trolls 
often operate with a network of social bots supporting the troll’s objective.      
Yet, this activity is not contained solely to Facebook. Additional popular social 
media outlets like Instagram, Reddit, Google, Twitter and YouTube have all reported 
evidence of Russian troll farms’ activities on their platforms.126 In his statement to the 
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Stretch also gave a broader assessment of 
the situation, explaining that “foreign actors, hiding behind fake accounts, abused our 
platform and other internet services to try to sow division and discord—and to try to 
undermine our election process— [which] is an assault on democracy.”127 In his 
testimony, Stretch indicated that Russian hybrid trolls misrepresenting themselves as U.S. 
citizens created and shared posts, paid to advertise and promote their specific pages, and 
paid for specific advertisements to be seen in other users News Feeds.128 While at a 
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different session of the same committee, the Acting General Counsel for Twitter, Sean 
Edgett, recounted similar activities also occurring on Twitter’s platform.129 During the 
testimony, Edgett also elaborated on the use of Russian spam, fake accounts and 
automated bots on Twitter, all of which were used to amplify the reach of their 
disinformation.130  
A presentation from the Chairman of the Committee, Senator Richard Burr, also 
demonstrated how these efforts to sow division among U.S. citizens could and on 
occasion had moved from social media platforms to public space. His presentation 
outlined how two Russian-sponsored groups, “Heart of Texas” and “United Muslims of 
America” managed to organize rival rallies at the same location and time in Houston, 
Texas which led to confrontation and disruption in the streets of an American city.131 A 
presentation by the Vice Chairman of the Committee, Senator Mark Warner, displayed 
Russian-produced content by a group named “Army of Jesus” which featured Hillary 
Clinton depicted as Satan in a boxing match with Jesus.132 Besides disparaging one of the 
candidates, Senator Warner’s presentation also demonstrated how Russian-sponsored 
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pages on social media platforms served to spread Russian disinformation more broadly 
by linking users to pseudo-news websites also maintained by Russian accounts.133              
Despite all the methods used to amplify divisive messages produced by hybrid 
trolls, their most effective method of advancing an ICO may also be their most 
straightforward, the data dump or, as it is sometime referred to, political doxing. As 
described in the prior section, hybrid trolls have a variety of methods to gain 
unauthorized access to candidates, political operators and political entities’ databases. 
While these political actors are increasingly aware of the vulnerabilities and working to 
protect their databases, it only takes a small weakness in a database’s SQL or one 
inattentive staff member being deceived by a spear-phishing email for a determined 
hybrid troll to gain entry. In fact, these two methods which are both exceedingly 
common, were responsible for two of the most infamous data dumps to date. French 
candidate Emmanuel Macron and his political party, La République En March!’s 
database was breached through the use of a SQL injection, while in the U.S., the Clinton 
campaign and the DNC’s were penetrated through the use of spear-phishing emails.     
These data dumps are typically timed to ensure that the potentially damaging 
information is released when it will have the greatest impact on the intended target. In the 
case of Emmanuel Macron’s campaign this meant days before the election runoff with 
Marine Le Pen and hours before an official election blackout which prevents the media 
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from reporting on the campaigns.134 As seen in the 2016 DNC leak, the perpetrators also 
go to great lengths to hid their identity which serves to obfuscate the true intention behind 
making the data public. The GRU affiliated persona “Guccifer 2.0,” provided the data 
with a third-party website, DCLeaks.com, which then moved the data along to Wikileaks 
and the broader public.135 Finally, once the data reaches the public sphere, the hybrid 
trolls with the assistance of botnets work in a coordinated manner to ensure it is amplified 
and reaches as broadly as possible.136     
As seen in this chapter, cyber operations are extremely adaptable and can be 
useful to intelligence services in a number of different ways. By utilizing cyber 
operations, a malicious actor or state can target election infrastructure, political 
operatives, elected officials, political candidates, political organizations as well as the 
broader public. While cyber operations can stand alone as a potent tool of intelligence 
agencies, they also have been used to support other types of active measures such as 
political influence operations and disinformation operations. Most alarmingly, there is no 
indication that cyber operations’ versatility has reached its limit. In fact, it’s likely that as 
social, political and business interactions increasingly transpire within cyberspace, cyber 
operations will continue to find new vulnerabilities to exploit.    
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Chapter Five: Purpose behind the Cyber Operations 
 As evidence of the Russian Federation’s use of cyber operations to disrupt or 
influence elections has become increasingly verifiable, the key question still to be 
answered is “why?” Why has Russia engaged in these cyber operations against elections? 
What was the purpose behind these cyber acts? Fortunately, an examination of Soviet 
history and current Russian national security doctrine offers an incredible amount of 
insight which can help answer these questions.  
Cyber operations designed to interfere in elections have been, by necessity, 
largely conducted as covert operations. It is important to remember that the reliance of 
aggressor states, in particular Russia, on covert operations like disinformation operations 
and cyber operations are not demonstrations of military strength. They are rather an 
adaptation meant to counter the superior conventional military strength of rival nations. 
This assertion is well supported by national military expenditure data, as in 2016 Russia 
spent under $83 billion on defense compared to the U.S. which spent over $611 billion.137 
By comparison, the Russian defense expenditure makes it a closer rival to Saudi Arabia 
which spent over $63 billion.  Russia’s defense budget is also outmatched by the 
combined expenditure of the United Kingdom and France which together spent just under 
$113 billion on defense in 2016.138 Unable to oppose the U.S. and its European allies in a 
conventional military confrontation, rival nations use nonconventional methods that are 
available. Nonconventional or asymmetrical methods of warfare, both new and old, have 
historically been the domain of state intelligence agencies. When considering the attack 
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on democratic states’ elections, it is more helpful to view cyber acts as the newest type of 
operation at the disposal of intelligence agencies rather than a new type of warfare. 
Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union, have throughout its history 
understood the crucial role nonconventional warfare could serve while facing a militarily 
superior opponent. In 1920, Vladimir Lenin wrote: 
The most powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the 
utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skillful, and 
obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any 
conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and 
among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various 
countries and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest 
opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, 
vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional.139 
This mentality, of employing subversion, deception and manipulation to further the 
group’s goals, made tactical sense for the Bolsheviks as a small group of revolutionaries 
trying to overthrow the militarily superior Tsarist regime in Moscow. It evolved into the 
Soviet concept of aktivnyye meropriyatiya or “active measures” and was “well integrated 
into Soviet policy and state structure, not only the KGB.”140 The U.S. Information 
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Agency elaborated on the different types of Soviet propaganda in a report to Congress in 
1988. The agency outlined three gradations of propaganda:141  
1.) Black propaganda which was disseminated by the KGB and composed of 
disinformation and forgeries meant to support a disinformation operation’s 
authenticity.142  
2.) White propaganda which was disseminated by elements of the Soviet press 
under the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee which generally maintained 
accuracy but supported the themes developed by active measures operations and framed 
their reports from a heavily pro-Soviet perspective.143  
3.) Gray propaganda which was disseminated by the International Department 
(ID) of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, local communist groups, Soviet-
backed international front groups, workers organizations and foreign-policy related 
academic institutions and contained both elements of truth and disinformation.144  
Further evidence supporting the centrality and importance of active measures operations 
in the Soviet security apparatus come from the long-standing head of the active measures 
operations for the East German Stasi, Colonel Rolf Wagenbreth. The Colonel practically 
echoed Lenin’s words, when he reportedly said “A powerful adversary can only be 
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defeated through ... sophisticated, methodical, careful, and shrewd effort to exploit even 
the smallest ‘cracks’ between our enemies ... and within their elites.”145  
During the Cold War, the U.S. intelligence community worked fastidiously to 
identify and counter Soviet active measures operations. In an FBI report to the House of 
Representatives in 1981, only declassified by the CIA in 2006, the agency outlines the 
different types of known active measures operations at the time, which include: efforts to 
manipulate the press in foreign countries, disinformation operations, political influence 
operations, forgery operations, and efforts to influence local groups such as arms control 
and disarmament movements, labor organizations, trade unions, religious 
organizations.146147 
According to an FBI report declassified in 2013, Soviet forgery operations were 
conducted with several goals in mind. They served to promote Soviet foreign policy 
goals, influence political action and public opinion in the U.S. and abroad and discredit 
the U.S. and its allies.148 These forgery operations typically targeted elected officials and 
the heads of government agencies from NATO-member countries. The falsified 
documents would then be widely circulated through cooperative pro-Soviet media outlets 
as well as unwitting international media outlets. Most frequently, the forgeries were 
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designed to supply ‘factual evidence’ for Moscow’s disinformation campaigns which had 
already been advanced by other active measure operations and propaganda.149 One 
example of alleged Soviet forgery came in the form of a letter sent anonymously to the 
Washington Post and U.S. New and World Report in 1986.150 The purported forgery was 
authored by the United States Information Agency (USIA) official Herbert Romerstein to 
Senator David Durenberger, the former Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence.151 The letter callously suggests that the USIA would inflate the reported 
number of Chernobyl victims in an effort to further discredit the USSR over the 
incident.152 The letter, having its intended effect, created an immediate public outcry 
from the European NATO-members even though it was immediately and thoroughly 
denied by all involved parties. 
In 1987, the FBI described political influence operations as one of the most 
increasingly common and sophisticated active measure programs utilized by the Soviet 
Union’s security apparatus.153 Soviet agents would secure the assistance, often 
unwittingly, of European and U.S. citizens who held similar foreign policy goals on 
specific issues as the Soviet Union.154 By misrepresenting themselves as religious 
leaders, trade representatives, journalists, UN officials or diplomats, the Soviet agents 
would both help establish and provide material aid for groups which held foreign policy 
                                                          
149 U.S. Cong. House. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Soviet Active Measures in the United States - An 
Updated Report by the FBI. C.W. Bill Young, 9 December 1987. 100th Cong. 1st sess. Central Intelligence 
Agency, Declassified, 13 September 2013. www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-
RDP11M01338R000400470089-2.pdf. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid. 
53 
 
positions favored by Moscow.155 These operations also varied in size. In some instances, 
Soviet operatives would target political figures in a foreign country by playing to their 
ego, offering meetings with high-level Soviet leaders, then exploiting the connection by 
disseminating a mixture of distorted truths and falsified information which was designed 
to advance Soviet foreign policy goals or by blackmailing the target to extract 
information.156157 While in other instances, a political influence operation was directed at 
the broader public through influencing prominent journalists.158 In one such case, a 
prominent French journalist, Pierre-Charles Pathe, a prolific writer and an influential 
voice in French political circles, was under Soviet patronage for over twenty years before 
the influence operation was detected by French intelligence agencies and Pathe was 
arrested.159  
As established in previous chapters, technological adaptation, specifically the 
integration of cyber operations within intelligence agencies, has led to an unprecedented 
amplification of political influence operations by taking full advantage of the reach 
provided by online social media. In bypassing the journalist who once stood as the 
gatekeepers to the wider public, these operations were able to craft their messaging more 
precisely, reach a significantly larger portion of the population and disseminate 
disinformation with significantly greater frequency. Today’s influence operations employ 
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a number of different methods which have amplified their messages. Popular social 
media outlets like Facebook, Instagram, Reddit, Google, Twitter and YouTube have all 
reported evidence of Russian troll farm activities on their platforms.160 In a statement to 
the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Facebook’s Vice President and 
General Counsel Colin Stretch claimed “foreign actors, hiding behind fake accounts, 
abused our platform and other internet services to try to sow division and discord—and to 
try to undermine our election process—is an assault on democracy.”161 In his testimony, 
Stretch indicated that Russian trolls misrepresenting themselves as U.S. citizens created 
and shared posts, paid to advertise and promote their specific pages, and paid for specific 
advertisements to be seen in other user’s News Feeds.162 While at another secession of 
the same committee, the Acting General Counsel for Twitter, Sean Edgett, indicated that 
similar activates were also occurring on Twitter’s platform.163 During the testimony, 
Edgett also elaborated on the use of Russian disinformation, fake accounts and social bots 
on Twitter, all of which were used to amplify their divisive messages.164  
Russia’s continued strategic use of active measures against rivals and its 
increasing use of cyber operations is not only supported by evidence provided by the 
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intelligence services countering Russia’s aggression. In fact, these disruptive and covert 
methods were written into the Russian National Security Strategy, a presidential edict 
issued by Vladimir Putin in December, 2015. In the security strategy document, Russia’s 
vision of its resurgent position and disruptive role in the international system becomes 
apparent even while invoking language which promotes global cooperation and 
sustainable development. When addressing Russia’s role in the modern world, the 
security strategy emphasizes enhancing its role in shaping a polycentric world, protecting 
the rights of compatriots abroad and maintaining and strengthening its economic potential 
in the face of restrictive economic measures introduced by other countries.165 While 
written with conciliatory language, some of these aims are quite clear. Enhancing 
Russia’s role in a polycentric, or multipolared world, requires the degradation of the US 
and its allies which according to the security strategy “are seeking to retain their 
dominance in world affairs.”166 Protecting the rights of compatriots abroad may sound 
benevolent, yet recent history in Georgia, Crimea and eastern Ukraine demonstrate that 
the desire to protect ethnic Russians can be used as a justification for military 
intervention within neighboring countries. Strengthening Russia’s economy in the face of 
economic restrictions, while unconfrontational in tone, also indicates Russia’s continued 
defiance against the economic sanctions imposed over its annexation of Crimea in 2014. 
These three clauses, read together, point to ongoing confrontation on the global stage as 
Russia continues to defy international law in the face of sanctions, remains a military 
threat to its neighbors and attempts to undermine the existing international order. 
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The security strategy document specifies a number of Russian national defense 
priorities, however these defensive concerns mirror Russia’s own tactics in their efforts 
abroad. While allegedly addressing a security concern, one particular section regarding 
informational and communication technologies reads more like a succinct description of 
Russia’s own strategy. It states, “The intensifying confrontation in the global information 
arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication 
technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public 
awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the 
international situation.” Similarly, the document points out potential security risks 
associated with the use of financial and business ties as well as energy policy as a means 
of political manipulation, all of which, are tactics Russia has been accused of using 
itself.167168 While the document does temper its language at certain points, it openly calls 
into question the viability of the Euro-Atlantic regional security system based on the 
collective defense of NATO and the European Union.169 When read in context with 
Russia’s recent maneuvers on the global stage, it becomes clear that this is the security 
doctrine of a nation with revisionist global ambitions.   
As it’s national security strategy provides a broader overview of Russia’s 
geopolitical objectives, the Doctrine of Informational Security of the Russian Federation 
signed by Vladimir Putin on December 5th, 2016, offers more specific detail as to the 
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purpose of Russian cyber operations. In a manner similar to the security strategy, it 
outlines informational security threats that are brazenly similar to the cyber operations 
Moscow itself has been accused of utilizing. One section warns that “extremist 
organizations widely use information tools to influence individual, group and public 
consciousness in order to fester interethnic and social tensions, incite ethnic or religious 
hatred or hostility, [and] spread extremist ideology” which sounds extremely similar to 
the cyber operations allegedly undertaken by the GRU’s hybrid troll and social bots.170 In 
a section related to information security and public security, Russian authorities warn of 
the “use of information technologies to promote extremist ideology, spread xenophobia 
and ideas of national exceptionalism for the purposes of undermining the [state’s] 
sovereignty, [as well as] political and social stability.”171 Here lies a crucial insight, 
Moscow believes the use of informational technologies, i.e. cyber operations, can 
promote extremist ideology which in turn undermines political and social stability and 
ultimately a state’s sovereignty.  
When one considers Russia’s historical reliance on active measures to counter 
rival conventional military strength, its open disdain for Euro-Atlantic regional security 
as provided by NATO and the European Union is clear. Russia’s promotion of corrosive 
extremist ideologies, political influence and disinformation via cyber operations paints a 
broader picture. The purpose behind these cyber operations is to amplify Russian efforts 
to undermine the social and political cohesion between the members of the European 
Union and NATO as well as between different groups within the member countries. Once 
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again, we recall Lenin, who in 1920 wrote, “the whole point lies in knowing how to apply 
these tactics”172 An equally important point, however is that Russian cyber operations 
should not be considered in isolation. They have become one of Russia’s most potent 
active measures, yet these active measures all work in tandem to advance Russia’s 
geopolitical objectives as a revisionist power.   
To further support this claim, it is worthwhile to examine the political parties 
which have been most critical of the European Union and NATO while also holding a 
more conciliatory position towards Russia. In a report, the Economist tallied the 
European political parties in which members were known to have personal and business 
ties with Russia’s political elite and oligarchs and also were supportive of relations with 
Russia. The parties included: Attack of Bulgaria, Golden Dawn and Syriza of Greece, 
Jobbik of Hungary, the Freedom Party of Austria, the National Front of France, the 
British National Party and the UK Independence Party of the United Kingdom, Podemos 
of Spain, the Northern League and Forza Italia of Italy, National Democratic Party and 
Alternative for Deutschland of Germany and Vlaams Belang of Belgium.173 While the 
U.S. Republican Party was not included in this list, President Trump has been 
unprecedently critical of NATO174, cheered the U.K.’s referendum to leave the European 
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Union175 and has been uniquely open to enhanced cooperation with Russia176 all while 
under the shadow of special prosecutor Robert Mueller’s investigation into potential ties 
to Russia. Admittedly, it is impossible to determine whether politicians from these parties 
have been the target of political influence operations or if they genuinely held 
conciliatory views towards Russian foreign policy. However, such personal and business 
ties are strikingly similar to the connections used by Soviet agents when they ran political 
influence operations in the past. If any of these politicians are the targets of Russian 
influence operations it also supports the argument that Russia is using all the active 
measures in their intelligence services’ repertoire to advance their geopolitical objectives.  
 The claims made here are expansive. Through evaluating the body of research for 
this thesis, it has become clear that Russian intelligence services, experts in the use of 
covert active measures to advance the Russian state’s geopolitical objectives, have 
effectively adopted cyber operations. Russian intelligence services have used cyber 
operations to both enhance the viability of their political influence and disinformation 
activities. By using cyber operations in tandem with other active measures, Russia was 
able to interfere in the democratic elections of states with a particular focus on those 
within the transatlantic community. This disruption was meant to impact the social and 
political stability of these Western societies, promote those who held sympathetic views 
of Russia and undermine the regional security as provided by NATO and the European 
Union. Crucially, this assessment is shared by many who are considered knowledgeable 
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on the matter. On March 8th, 2018, the commander of U.S. European Command and 
NATO’s supreme allied commander, Cutis M. Scaparrotti addressed the Senate Armed 
Services Committee. In his testimony, Commander Scaparrotti claimed:  
Russia seeks to change the international order, fracture NATO, and 
undermine U.S. leadership in order to protect its regime, re-assert 
dominance over its neighbors, and achieve greater influence around the 
globe. To achieve these ends, the Kremlin is prepared to employ the full 
spectrum of Russia’s power, … Additionally, Russia aggressively uses 
social media and other means of mass communication to push 
disinformation, test the resolve of the United States, and erode our 
credibility with European partners. … Russia is advancing its indirect and 
asymmetric capabilities in accordance with its concept of warfare, which 
envisions the coordinated use of military and non-military elements of 
national power to shape the strategic environment. Throughout Europe, 
Russia exercises malign influence to disrupt and attempt to fracture 
NATO, undermine trans-Atlantic cohesion, and erode democratic 
foundations. Russia interferes in the electoral process across numerous 
states, including supporting a plan to violently disrupt elections in 
Montenegro, the newest member of NATO. Russia works to influence the 
geopolitical environment through the use of key acquisitions, proxies, and 
other agents of influence. Using indirect action, particularly against 
countries along its periphery, Russia seeks to use information operations 
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and cyberspace operations to manipulate and influence the information 
domain and to shape a narrative of its choosing.177 
As evidence collected by the transatlantic communities’ intelligence services on Russian 
cyber and political influence operations continues to accumulate and experts like 
Supreme Commander Scaparrotti share their assessments on Russian cyber operations, 
the purpose behind Russia’s cyber operations become increasingly irrefutable.   
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Chapter Six: Quantifying the Effects  
This chapter focuses on available public data, primarily in the form of 
international polling and survey data, to answer the question first posed in Chapter One, 
“What were the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors to 
disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated 
cyber operations?” Here I compare the quantitative data collected from “consolidated 
democracies”178 which were targeted by cyber operations directed against elections 
described in a Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report179 with the data collected 
for a control group of consolidated democracies which have not experienced similar 
cyber operations in order to assess the effects of cyber acts.  
The data primarily used in the quantitative analysis was collected by Gallup 
World Poll which conducts annual phone and in-person interviews in over 160 countries 
with an average of 1,000 participants to track national perceptions on both domestic and 
international issues.180 I selected the polling questions, “In this country, do you have 
confidence in the national government?” and “In this country, do you have confidence in 
the honesty of elections?” to serve as indicators of the potential effects of  cyber 
                                                          
178 The countries in this chapter are defined as ‘‘consolidated democracies,’’ a term taken from the 
Freedom House “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis”, which ranks and measures the 
progress toward or backsliding from democracy. The ranking is determined by an assessment of a country’s 
national democratic governance, electoral process, civil society, independent media, local democratic 
governance, judicial framework and independence, and corruption. Countries receiving the consolidated 
democracy classification are defined as ones that ‘‘embody the best policies and practices of liberal 
democracy but may face challenges—often associated with corruption—that contribute to a slightly lower 
score.’’ Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2018: Democracy in Crisis.” 
179 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and 
Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security (S.Prt.115-21). Report. 10 January 2018. 115th Cong. 2nd 
sess. Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2018. (S.Prt.115-21). 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/FinalRR.pdf.  
180 “How Does Gallup’s Global Poking Work?” Gallup.com. www.news.gallup.com/poll/128189/Gallup-
global-polling-work.aspx.  
63 
 
operations. These particular questions were selected because if the objective behind cyber 
operations was to increase hyper-partisanship and erode the legitimacy of democratically-
elected leaders then changes in the populations’ response to these questions could 
demonstrate the effect of the operations.  
The consolidated democracies which endured the most prolific cyber operations 
directed at their elections as described again in the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations report were the Netherlands, France, Germany and Italy. 181 The United States 
has also been added to this test group since it has similarly been targeted by cyber 
operations as established in other various Senate reports.182 The control group, composed 
of consolidated democracies in which there is scant evidence of cyber operations against 
their elections, includes Ireland, Iceland, Canada, Portugal and Luxembourg. By 
comparing the data between the test group and control group, it will be possible to 
observe emerging trends within the data. Polling data gathered from 2008 was chosen as 
a base year for comparison purposes because none of the countries which endured cyber 
operations against their elections had yet to report evidence of active cyber operations. 
Likewise, polling data collected from 2016 was chosen for comparison against the base 
year because, as noted in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report and Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence report, all of the countries in the test group alleged 
active cyber operations targeting their elections during the given year.          
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The control group, Ireland, Iceland, Canada, Portugal and Luxembourg, were 
selected because they all fall within the criteria of consolidated democracies and little to 
no evidence of active cyber operations against their national elections has yet to emerge. 
By taking the individual country’s responses to the polling questions and calculating the 
control group’s mean number for each potential response, ‘confidence,’ ‘no confidence’ 
and ‘unsure confidence,’ an average response for the control group is established. In 
2008, when asked “In this country, do you have confidence in the national government?”, 
the control group’s mean numbers showed 50.4% of respondents expressed ‘confidence’ 
in the national government, 43% of respondents expressed ‘no confidence’ in the national 
government and 6.4% of respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence’ in the national 
government. The control group’s mean numbers for the second question, “In this country, 
do you have confidence in the honesty of elections?” in the same given year indicated 
72.2% of respondents expressing ‘confidence’ in the honesty of elections, 22.6% of 
respondents expressing ‘no confidence’ in the honesty of elections and 5.4% of 
respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence’ in the honesty of elections. Against these 
base numbers we will compare the mean numbers for the control group eight years later.  
The control group’s mean number, or average responses to the survey questions, 
showed little change from the findings of 2008 responses and what was found in the 2016 
responses. For the question regarding confidence in national government 56.6% of 
respondents expressed ‘confidence,’ 39.8% of respondents expressed ‘no confidence,’ 
and 3.4% of respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence.’ For the question on confidence 
in the honesty of elections, there were also only small changes with 71.8% of respondents 
expressing ‘confidence,’ 25.8% of respondents expressing ‘no confidence,’ and 2.2% of 
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respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence.’ That represents an average increase in the 
control group’s confidence in their respective national governments by 6.2% and an 
average decrease in the control group’s lack of confidence by 3.2%. The change in the 
control group’s confidence in the honesty of elections was negligible at -.4% of 
respondents while those who lack confidence rose just 3.2%. All together the changes 
seen between 2008 and 2016 in the control group’s confidence in their national 
governments and the honesty of their elections were moderately small.  
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The polling data from the control group of consolidated democracies is displayed 
here:183184 
Country/Year Control Group Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence 
Ireland     
2008 Confidence in National Government  51% 47% 1% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  57% 38% 4% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 70% 28% 2% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 71% 26% 2% 
Iceland     
2008 Confidence in National Government  26% 66% 8% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  61% 36% 3% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 84% 13% 4% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 87% 12% 1% 
Canada     
2008 Confidence in National Government  59% 39% 2% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  62% 38% 0% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 67% 31% 2% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 69% 30% 1% 
Portugal     
2008 Confidence in National Government  34% 49% 17% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  35% 57% 8% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 61% 25% 14% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 56% 40% 4% 
Luxembourg    
2008 Confidence in National Government  82% 14% 4% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  68% 30% 2% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 79% 16% 5% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 76% 21% 3% 
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The test group of consolidated democracies saw a more dramatic change over the 
same timeframe. After collecting the individual country’s responses to the polling 
questions and calculating the test group’s mean numbers for each potential response, 
‘confidence,’ ‘no confidence’ and ‘unsure confidence,’ we can draw comparisons 
between the test group’s 2008 and 2016 responses. In 2008, when asked “In this country, 
do you have confidence in the national government?”, the test group’s mean numbers 
showed 44.8% of respondents expressed ‘confidence’ in the national government, 49% of 
respondents expressed ‘no confidence’ in the national government and 6.8% of 
respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence’ in the national government. The mean 
numbers for the second question, “In this country, do you have confidence in the honesty 
of elections?” in the same year, showed 59.8% of respondents expressing ‘confidence’ in 
the honesty of elections, 36% of respondents expressing ‘no confidence’ in the honesty of 
elections and 4.6% of respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence’ in the honesty of 
elections. Against these base numbers we can compare the mean numbers for the test 
group’s data from eight years later.  
The test group’s mean numbers had changed more substantially in the 2016 
responses. For the question regarding confidence in national government 38.8% of 
respondents expressed ‘confidence,’ 59.8% of respondents expressed ‘no confidence,’ 
and 1.2% of respondents expressed ‘unsure confidence.’ For the question focused on 
confidence in the honesty of elections, there were noticeable changes as well with 52.4% 
of respondents expressing ‘confidence,’ 46% of respondents expressing ‘no confidence,’ 
and 1.4% of respondents expressing ‘unsure confidence.’ That represents an average 
decrease in the test group’s confidence in their national governments by 6% and an 
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average increase in the test group’s lack of confidence in their national governments by 
10.8%. The change in the test group’s confidence in the honesty of elections was also 
more dramatic, decreasing by 7.4% while those who lack confidence rose by 10%. Taken 
together the changes seen between 2008 and 2016 in the test group’s confidence in their 
national governments and the honesty of their elections was fairly significant.  
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The polling data from the test group of consolidated democracies is displayed 
here:185186 
Country/Year Test Group Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence 
United States     
2008 Confidence in National Government  38% 62% 1% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  30% 69% 1% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 47% 53% 0% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 30% 69% 1% 
Italy     
2008 Confidence in National Government  36% 49% 15% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  24% 75% 1% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 52% 35% 14% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 35% 63% 1% 
Germany     
2008 Confidence in National Government  43% 51% 6% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  55% 43% 2% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 49% 47% 4% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 71% 27% 2% 
France     
2008 Confidence in National Government  45% 49% 6% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  28% 70% 1% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 66% 31% 4% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 52% 46% 2% 
The Netherlands    
2008 Confidence in National Government  62% 34% 6% 
2016 Confidence in National Government  57% 42% 1% 
2008 Confidence in Honesty of Election 85% 14% 1% 
2016 Confidence in Honesty of Election 74% 25% 1% 
 
 It’s important to establish that it would be unwise to draw any direct correlations 
between this analysis of changing perspectives of national governments and honesty in 
elections and Russian cyber operations against elections. While there are too many 
                                                          
185 “Confidence in National Governments, 2006 – 2017.” Gallup World Poll. Gallup, Inc., 2018. 
www.gallup.com/analytics/213704/world-poll.aspx. 
186 “Confidence in Honesty of Elections, 2006 – 2017.” Gallup World Poll. Gallup, Inc., 2018. 
www.gallup.com/analytics/213704/world-poll.aspx. 
70 
 
country-specific political caveats to establish a correlation, the analysis does show trends 
that support the argument that cyber operations are having an effect on elections. 
Findings from the control group appear to indicate a growing confidence in the 
respondents’ national governments and a small decline in those who lacked of confidence 
in them. Simultaneously, the control group saw only a slight decrease in their confidence 
in the honesty of their elections and a small increase in the number of respondents 
expressing a lack of confidence.  
187188 
By comparison, the test group’s confidence in national elections actually declined 
a moderate amount while those with a lack of confidence in the national government 
increases substantially. Most significant was the decline in the test groups confidence in 
elections and their increase in respondents with no confidence in the honestly of 
elections, both of which saw substantial increases. The trend in this data is clear, between 
2008 and 2016 the control group saw slight increase in its confidence in national 
governments while its confidence in the honesty of elections declined only marginally. 
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Control Group - Ireland, Iceland, Canada, Portugal and Luxembourg
Confidence in National Government Confidence in Honesty of Election
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
2008 50.40% 43% 6.40% 72.20% 22.60% 5.40%
2016 56.60% 39.80% 3.40% 71.80% 25.80% 2.20%
% Change 6.20% -3.20% -3% -0.40% 3.20% -3.20%
Test Group - United States, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands
2008 44.80% 49% 6.80% 59.80% 36% 4.60%
2016 38.80% 59.80% 1.20% 52.40% 46% 1.40%
% Change -6% 10.80% -5.60% -7.40% 10% -3.20%
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As for the test group, it saw both moderate decreases in its confidence in national 
governments and its confidence in the honesty of elections. The test group’s trends 
between 2008 and 2016 are straightforward and support (but cannot definitively be 
proven) the argument that cyber operations are having a disruptive or influential effect on 
the electoral process in democratic states. 
The trends indicated from the analysis are more alarming when considered in a 
broader context. A global survey which collected data from respondents in 38 countries 
conducted in 2017 by Pew Research Center found that only 23% of respondents were 
fully committed to representative democracy. 189 Shockingly, a plurality of respondents at 
47%, showed less commitment to representative democracy while indicating an openness 
to other forms of governance. Alarmingly, 13% of respondents indicated a commitment 
to nondemocratic forms of governance. 190 While it is impossible to test the control group 
against this data set as they were not all represented in the survey, we can find the mean 
response from our test group. Compared to the global median, the test group’s average 
response does not seem quite as shocking, it does indicate an alarming openness to 
alternative forms of governance.191 This openness to alternative forms of governance is 
only made more of a concern by the declining confidence in national governments and 
honesty of elections trend established for the test group earlier.  
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Commitment to Representative 
Democracy192 
 Committed Less Committed Nondemocratic 
United States 40% 46% 7% 
The Netherlands 47% 37% 8% 
Italy 37% 42% 9% 
United Kingdom 36% 47% 10% 
France 35% 45% 10% 
Test Group's Average 39% 43% 9% 
  
 As disconcerting as these emerging trends are, it is also important to contextualize 
the results along with other quantitative findings. These indicate that the health of 
democracy and the electoral process remain robust. The Economist Intelligence Unit has 
constructed a democratic index for over 165 states, collecting data on various quantitative 
factors with which they calculate a measurement of democracy’s health in a nation since 
2006. “The Democracy Index is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism; 
civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political 
culture.”193 When the test group and control group are tested against the Economist 
Intelligence Unit’s findings it helps to temper the earlier findings regarding declining 
confidence in national governments and honesty in elections. This can be seen by 
comparing the control group and the test group’s annual scores on the democratic index 
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which indicate few discrepancies between the two groups and show little volatility since 
the measurement was first taken in 2006.  
 
 
Test Group's Democratic Index Score: 
 
194 
Control Group's Democratic Index Score: 
195 
                                                          
* Data for a given year is unavailable. 
194 “Democracy Index 2017: Free Speech Under Attack.” The Economist, London, 2017. 
http://pages.eiu.com/rs/753-RIQ-438/images/Democracy_Index_2017.pdf. 
195 Ibid. 
Year United StatesItaly France United Kingdom Netherlands Test Group's Average
2006 8.22 7.73 8.07 8.08 9.66 8.352
2007 * * * * * *
2008 8.22 7.98 8.07 8.15 9.53 8.39
2009 * * * * * *
2010 8.18 7.83 7.77 8.16 8.99 8.186
2011 8.11 7.74 7.77 8.16 8.99 8.154
2012 8.11 7.74 7.88 8.21 8.99 8.186
2013 8.11 7.85 7.92 8.31 8.84 8.206
2014 8.11 7.85 8.04 8.31 8.92 8.246
2015 8.05 7.98 7.92 8.31 8.92 8.236
2016 7.98 7.98 7.92 8.36 8.8 8.208
2017 7.98 7.98 7.8 8.53 8.89 8.236
Year Iceland Ireland Canada Luxembourg Portugal Control Group's Average
2006 9.71 9.01 9.07 9.1 8.16 9.01
2007 * * * * * *
2008 9.65 9.01 9.07 9.1 8.05 8.976
2009 * * * * * *
2010 9.65 8.79 9.08 8.88 8.02 8.884
2011 9.65 8.56 9.08 8.88 7.81 8.796
2012 9.65 8.56 9.08 8.88 7.92 8.818
2013 9.65 8.68 9.08 8.88 7.65 8.788
2014 9.58 8.72 9.08 8.88 7.79 8.81
2015 9.58 8.85 9.08 8.88 7.79 8.836
2016 9.5 9.15 9.15 8.81 7.86 8.894
2017 9.58 9.15 9.15 8.81 7.84 8.906
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Viewing the data comprehensively, there are a few findings that stand out most 
clearly. Compared against the control group, the test group of consolidated democracies 
displayed declining confidence in both their national governments and the honesty of 
their elections. While one cannot directly assert a correlation between Russia’s use of 
cyber operations against elections and these findings they do establish an alarming trend. 
Furthermore, a plurality of respondents from our test group are, at least in surveys, open 
to other forms of governance besides representative democracy while a sizable minority 
are even open to nondemocratic forms of governance. This aspect is crucial as it indicates 
if the trends of decreasing confidence in national governments and honesty of elections 
are not reversed, there are significant portions of society within the test group countries 
that would be open to alternative forms of governance. As disturbing as these trends 
appear, by other measures democratic and electoral health remain strong. Considering the 
implications that both the test and control groups have maintained strong scores on the 
democratic index for over a decade, the health of the democratic and electoral institutions 
does not seem to be a concern. Rather, the findings are indicative of the electorate which 
is made up of people and if people increasingly perceive these institutions with 
diminished confidence it could undermine the system as a whole.     
See Annex A for graphic representation of each individual country’s annual 
confidence in their national government and confidence in the honesty of their elections.  
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Chapter Seven: Russia’s International Meddling and Active Measures – An 
Interview with a Former Eastern European Official 
This study has established in previous chapters that cyber operations are just one 
type of active measure Russia has employed to accomplish its strategic goal of countering 
and degrading the Euro-Atlantic regional security framework provided by the European 
Union and NATO. These efforts are ongoing and multipronged. While government 
officials and the media in Western Europe and North America are only starting to become 
aware of these Russian objectives, many in Eastern Europe have experienced first-hand 
what Russian active measures can accomplish when not sufficiently confronted. This 
chapter offers insight into Russian active measures witnessed and experienced by a 
former government official from Moldova. The former official, Vladimir Lupan, has held 
numerous high-level government positions in which he has witnessed with rising alarm 
Russia’s growing influence and the corrosive effects of its active measures on regional 
domestic politics.  
 In order to appreciate Mr. Lupan’s account, we must first contextualize 
Moldova geographically, historically and geopolitically. Given Moldova’s relatively low 
international profile, its place on the map remains obscure to many. Moldova, a former 
Soviet republic, is an Eastern European country wedged between northeastern Romania 
and southwestern Ukraine which gained its independent in 1991. Its capital, Chișinău, 
lies in between the two rivers which dominate the country. To the west, the Prut River 
serves as a border with Romania, while to the east the Dniestr River and adjacent lands 
border Ukraine. Circumstances in the east are complicated by what many Moldovans 
have seen as evidence of Russia’s continued international meddling in the country. Trans-
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Dniestr or Transnistria, a strip of land between Ukraine and the Dniestr River which 
ranges from two to 25 miles wide, is the home of a Russian-supported secessionist 
movement and has been a source of tension even preceding Moldova’s independence. 
The roots of the division can be traced to the Soviet Union’s earliest expansionist 
policies. When Soviet authorities first decided to create the Moldavian Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR) on March 7th, 1924, it was composed of the 
Transnistria region and portions of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian 
SSR) and, though autonomous, fell under the administration of the Ukrainian SSR.196 
Historians suspect the Moldavian ASSR (MASSR) was created by the Soviets to serve 
the duel purposes of bolstering Soviet claims to Bessarabia, an eastern territory of the 
Kingdom of Romania which bordered the newly-created MASSR, and exporting the 
Soviet’s ideology to Romania and the wider Balkans region.197 In pursuit of these goals, 
the Soviets directed both industrialization and Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian 
immigration to the region.198 In 1939, as a stipulation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
Nazi Germany recognized Soviet sovereignty in Bessarabia which led to Romania 
relinquishing the territory and its incorporation into the newly-formed Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (Moldavian SSR) in 1940.199 During WWII, with German military 
assistance the Romanians gained control of the Moldavian SSR briefly but it was 
recaptured by the Soviets in 1944.200 For clarity, Bessarabia, formerly part of the 
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Kingdom of Romanian, comprises the western portion of modern day Moldova together 
with Transnistria to east.  
In the aftermath of the war, the Moldavian SSR was reinstated. Soviet 
immigration and development patterns established before the war, strengthened by Soviet 
suspicion of ethnic Moldavians’ loyalty to the USSR, led to a reemergence of 
industrialization policy which was preferential to Transnistria at the expense of the rest of 
the Moldavian SSR.201 These patterns were self-perpetuating as a lack of development 
led to resentment among the ethnic Moldavians in the west and as job opportunities drew 
ethnic Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians to Transnistria which in turn spurred greater 
investment in the territory.202 As the USSR was dissolving, these patterns had created 
pronounced ethnic distinctions and immense disparities in industrial capacity between 
Transnistria and the rest of Moldavia.203   
These regional ethnic and industrial discrepancies within Moldovia, led to societal 
cleavages that erupted into violence before the country had even declared independence 
in 1991.204 By September, 1989, Tiraspol which served as Transnistria’s de facto capital, 
was demanding protections for minority languages and to preserve the region’s political 
clout.205 As the USSR demise appeared increasingly inevitable, many ethnic Russians, 
Belarusians and Ukrainians in Transnistria took the preemptive step of declaring 
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Transnistrian independence, establishing what they called the Pridnestrovian Moldavian 
Republic, out of fear of Moldova’s potential reunification with Romania.206 This move 
quickly led to conflict. Between November 1990 and July 1992, Transnistrian separatists, 
with alleged support from the Russian 14th Army regiment stationed within the region, 
fought the newly-formed Moldavian military forces to a cease fire.207 In the aftermath of 
the conflict, Russia maintained a military presence in the region and offered its support 
for Tiraspol both politically and economically.208            
While support for Transnistria represents Russia’s most overt example of 
interfering in Moldova’s domestic politics, in many ways, it served only as the entry 
point for Russian covert efforts at interference within the country.209 Since Moldova 
declared independence on August 27th, 1991, Moscow has used negotiations with the 
breakaway region and the issue of protecting the rights of ethnic Russians as a way to 
involve itself in Moldovan affairs.210 As established in the 1994 Constitution, the country 
adopted a democratic, unicameral parliamentary republic and saw a democratic and 
centrist agrarian party win a plurality of parliamentary seats in the country’s first election 
held same year. These early years saw the country’s state-directed economy transition to 
a market-based economy which caused economic pain and resulted in declining and 
dismal GDP growth that continued until 1999.211 Economic headwinds as well as 
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nostalgia for the relative calm of the Soviet era provided potent campaign issues and 
secured an electoral plurality for the Party of Communists in the 1998 election.212 The 
remaining vote was divided between three pro-democratic parties, all of which were 
advocating greater integration with Western Europe, while the agrarian party which held 
power was stripped of all representation.213 The Party of Communists, difficult to place 
on a traditional ideological spectrum, held deeply conservative social views and 
advocated for greater ties with Russia, while nominally promoting a left-leaning 
economic platform.214 A similar pattern continues to the modern day, with the 
government switching hands between a communist party in support of greater ties to 
Russia and a coalition of liberal and centrist parties in support of greater ties to the 
European Union.215 Those who support greater integration with the EU, would argue that 
whenever they made significant steps towards their goal, Russian domestic interference 
became more pronounced.216   
While this summation could not possibly capture all the subtleties of Moldovan 
domestic politics or its historic relations with Russia or Western Europe, it should 
provide enough background to contextualize the proceeding interview with Vladimir 
Lupan. Mr. Lupan has had a distinguished career, serving as a member of the Moldovan 
Parliament, during which time he served on the Committee on National Security, Defense 
and Public Order and as an alternate member on its Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
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European Integration.217 In addition, Mr. Lupan has served as Foreign Policy Adviser to 
the Acting President of the Republic of Moldova and held numerous diplomatic posts 
including Ambassador & Permanent Representative of the Republic of Moldova to the 
United Nations, Head of Political-Military Cooperation with the NATO and a member of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Croatia.218 
Over the course of his career, he has advocated for greater cooperation between Moldova 
and the European Union, opposed increasing ties to the Russian Federation and loudly 
objected to Russia’s incursion within Moldovan politics. In expressing these positions, 
Mr. Lupan has himself become the target of a disinformation operation. He now resides 
in New York, working as an independent expert in international affairs, where he was 
gracious enough to share his thoughts on Russia’s international meddling and active 
measures. As the interview was extensive, in order to ensure clarity and concision 
portions specifically relevant to Russian cyber operations and active measures are 
presented here. The interview in its entirety can be found in Annex B.    
 
Interviewer: How would you describe relations between Russia 
and Moldova since Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the 
European Union in 2014? Can you elaborate on any role Russia may have 
in Moldova’s domestic politics with regards to the breakaway region of 
Transnistria? 
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Vladimir: In 1998, there was even a partnership agreement with 
the EU and we began negotiating the partnership agreement in 1994 and it 
was agreed to in 1998. In 1999-2000 there was an agreement to upgrade 
the partnership. Moldova only became independent in 1991 and started 
negotiating with the EU in 1994 so it was only three years. Moldova has a 
history of moving towards the EU, practically from its independence but 
Russia showed its true face with the Kozak Memorandum. What was the 
purpose of this exclusive veto power for the separatists? It is to give them 
autonomy and Russia has influence over this faction. It’s is purely an 
attempt to grant them leverage over Moldova. They would have the power 
in the decision process, we called this the Transnistria-ization of Moldova. 
Later, you also saw the Transnistria-ization of Ukraine and the 
developments were essentially the same. This process involves 
federalization which sounds good but the plan was written by Russia in 
such a manner to give a small actor veto power over the larger actor be it 
Moldova or Ukraine while Russia maintains influence over that small 
minority. You can even see these same tactics being applied in the United 
States, it’s a different matter but during the 2016 elections there were 
numerous succession groups in the United States that were supported by 
Russia. In this way Moldova is a testing ground. However, in 2013, in 
Moldova you saw a backlash both internally and externally which caused 
the Party of Communists to reject the Kozak Memorandum and Russia 
responded harshly with the embargo of wines and manipulation of energy, 
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in the form of gas, prices. It was a form of punishment. You could see 
Germany paying less for gas than Moldova even though it is farther from 
Russia. The EU does not act with a single voice so it’s much easier to 
attempt to divide and conquer the member states. It’s worth remembering 
that Vladimir Putin was the head of the KGB an organization that had 
worked on dividing and conquering Europe for years.  
 
Interviewer: You’ve called Moldova a testing ground for Russian 
political interference on Twitter and in response to the Russian 
disinformation campaigns in July, 2017, the Moldovan Parliament finally 
adopted an Anti-Propaganda Law. Can you explain what prompted the 
law, how it was justified and received domestically and if you believe it’s 
proving effective?  
Vladimir: When I say Moldova is a “testing ground” you have to 
understand that I’m referring to the use of proxies, and by proxy, I mean a 
military that will do the dirty work without wearing your insignia. This 
concept is equally applicable in all Russia’s efforts and not necessarily 
only military. Try to be more flexible in your thinking. Whatever means 
Russia can find in a country to use it against that country, if it is a political 
party or a paramilitary, if it’s a struggling population longing for some 
specific relation or benefits from Russia then they will become a 
paramilitary, if there is a hacker who is interested in making the 
government pay a price, for example Edward Snowden and the U.S., then 
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they will use that against the country. They will use Wikileaks to release 
documents or when possible, they will use their own “patriotic” hackers to 
release any data when possible.  
 
Interviewer: Pro-Russian media in Moldova have been spreading 
news of the imminent restitution of historical land and property held by 
Ukrainian citizens to Poland and likewise Moldovans having to return land 
and property to Romania. According to these fake reports, the Association 
Agreements that both Ukraine and Moldova signed with the European 
Union in 2014 calls for such restitution. The Association Agreement calls 
for nothing of this sort. What effects have such online “fake news” sources 
had on Moldova and how can “fake news” propagated online be 
neutralized?  
Vladimir: It’s funny you mention this. These stories of Moldova 
having to give territory back to Romania. Here in New York, I was sitting 
with my Russian barber and he asked me about this very issue. He asked 
me why Moldovans would accept giving up territory in order to join the 
European Union. I asked him where he had heard this and he pointed to 
his television. It was on Russia-1 [a state-sponsored, Russian language 
channel carried internationally]. I told him it wasn’t the case which he had 
trouble believing. This is occurring all the time and because there are few 
channels here in Russian many Russians who live abroad see these types 
of reports. They have an effect. There is disinformation but you should 
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look up the concept of Whataboutism by the journalist Michael Bernard, 
its similar to the tu quoque logical fallacy. It is a technique the Soviets 
used where if someone says something critical, you change the topic to 
something distracting and more preferable. Americans would object to a 
specific Soviet human rights abuse and the Soviets would counter with 
something like “What about racism in America?” Obviously, both aren’t 
good but the objective of the person using Whataboutism was to change 
the subject. How can “fake news” propagated online be neutralized? Well, 
as we saw, this is difficult. There can be laws but as in Moldova you have 
to see the details of those laws. 
 
Interviewer: Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the 
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the Federal Security Services 
(FSB) are believed to have played a part in Russia’s interference in the 
2016 US presidential election through online groups respectively known 
as “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear” by penetrating the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) in 2015 and releasing stolen and compromising 
information at a time when it would have the greatest political impact. 
Have you seen any comparable efforts in past Moldovan elections or do 
you suspect they could take place in next year’s parliamentary elections?  
Vladimir: In Moldova, the tactics used by Russia are more brazen. 
They can use tactics they wouldn’t dare to use in the United States. Rather 
than covertly attempting to manipulate an election, they can afford to be 
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overt in their support of a party or candidates. This is combined with 
disinformation against candidates who stand up to Russia or promote 
deeper integration with the European Union. In this was the situation is 
different between Moldova and the United States.   
 
Interviewer: Russia has a long record of targeting outspoken critics 
in an attempt to delegitimize them in the public eye. Considering your 
position and outspoken criticism of Russian propaganda campaigns, have 
you had any experiences with cyber intrusion or attempts to compromise 
your character that you would be willing to share?     
Vladimir: This occurred when I was serving as the Ambassador & 
Permanent Representative of Moldova to the United Nations over the 
Russian involvement in Syria. There were Russian media reports claiming 
I had proposed rescinding Russia’s veto authority on the United Nations 
Security Council. This is impossible. There is absolutely nothing in the 
UN Charter about removing a Security Council member’s right to a veto. 
There is no mechanism for that, so it would be impossible. This was about 
building pressure diplomatically. Similar circumstances happened to 
others at the UN over Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. As you 
know, Moldova is not on the Security Council and even if it was, there is 
no way to take away a veto from a Security Council member. It fits a 
pattern though, they take elements of truth, in this case, another diplomat 
had proposed a resolution in which veto authority would be challenged on 
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a one-time issue for countries that prevented serious inquires on war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide and shape it to their 
purposes.      
 
Interviewer: What are the long-term objectives of Russia’s cyber 
aggression and propaganda campaigns? 
Vladimir: The purpose of Russian ops is not only to deceive the 
West but also to destroy the values of the West. They target our collective 
values. They want to destroy the rule of law in these countries. They want 
to undermine the EU and NATO. They do this by bashing relations 
between countries with things like gas price manipulation and they do it 
within countries by bashing certain political parties. It’s about freedom to 
act. It’s about realpolitik, when certain national security issues are present, 
Russia understands realpolitik well and they use the resources available. 
Essentially, Russia sees the United States as a country that can prohibit 
them, for external and internal reasons, from expanding. Therefore, any 
attempt by an administration to try to stop Russian actions will actually 
face some sort of response. In order to solve a problem, you need to have a 
willing partner, that’s the bilateral part of negotiations, you need to agree 
on a certain set of actions, up to now I have not seen Russia willing to 
stop. What we’ve see is Russia trying to restore its status as a superpower, 
which they are incapable of. They are a regional power but not a 
superpower, they cannot do more than that.     
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After discussing Russia’s efforts at internal interference in Moldovan politics and 
its use of active measures, what became clear, was the fact that Russian active measures 
are adaptable and different active measures are used to meet the needs of a given 
situation and its context. Moscow may not need to use cyber interference in Moldova 
because it can utilize leverage against individual politicians or even political parties. 
While such tactics are too transparent to be used effectively in some Western European 
countries and the United States, if they work within a specific context, Russia will not 
hesitate.  
In contemplating Russia’s use of active measures, there is two commonalities that 
all the active measures seem to share. The first is their ability to erode a society’s 
commitment to the rule of law. Be it promoting the distribution of knowingly stolen 
emails to the electoral detriment of a political opponent or providing financial incentives 
to politicians to support dubious geopolitical positions. It is in this slow erosion of a 
country’s commitment to the rule of law, that active measures also find their second 
commonality which is the promotion of Russia’s long-term geopolitical objectives. This 
is because at the center of Russia’s geopolitical ambitions is a desire to remove the model 
of governance offered by nations in Western Europe and North America. Russia’s 
governance is built on a system of corruption and patronage, it relies on a network of 
oligarchs maintaining Vladimir Putin’s favor and it has no ideological underpinning. The 
Russian regime seeks the dissolution of the European Union and the breakup of NATO as 
long-term strategic goals because they stand as attractive alternatives to the Russian form 
of governance.      
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 In this thesis I have attempted to answer some basic questions about the use of 
cyber operations as a means to disrupt, alter or influence state’s electoral processes. The 
research involved in answering these questions unearthed some alarming insight into the 
ways in which evolving technology has and likely will continue to be adopted by state 
intelligence agencies. These new cyber operations have expanded the efficacy and scope 
of intelligence agencies’ operations as well as presented the opportunity for innovative, 
new, covert operations to be conceived and carried out. While limitations in available 
data and geopolitical realities narrowed the scope of this research to a focus on, primarily, 
Russian cyber operations directed at state’s electoral processes, there is ample evidence 
to support the international community’s concern regarding Russia’s malign use of cyber 
operations in general.  
 In the introduction to this thesis, I outlined several questions which aimed to 
uncover the various aspects of cyber operations and their potential impact on electoral 
processes. After examining the research and findings, it is worthwhile to reconsider those 
questions:   
• What is the evidence that there have been verifiable attempts by states, state-
directed actors, or non-state actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral 
process in democratic states through coordinated cyber operations? 
 Over the course of the research, numerous documented cyber investigations have 
emerged. These cyber investigations, conducted by independent experts and international 
organizations as well as the U.S. intelligence community, have asserted with high levels 
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of confidence that Russian state-sponsored actors have been involved in various attempts 
to disrupt, alter and influence state’s electoral processes.219220221222  
• What were the methods used by states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors to 
disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states through 
coordinated cyber operations? 
 For clarity, the methods used to disrupt, alter and influence electoral processes 
were organized into three types of cyber operations based on the primary target of the 
operation. The designated targets for each type of those cyber operations were the voting 
equipment and election infrastructure, the elected officials, political operatives and 
political parties and the broader public. Evidence uncovered by the FBI’s Cyber Division 
demonstrates the depth and scope of Russia’s cyber operations that penetrated U.S. 
state’s voting registries and electoral boards.223 Independent cyber investigations led by 
the industry’s leading firms SecureWorks and TrendMicro have traced the most notorious 
examples of cyber operations against political campaigns, the Clinton and Macron 
presidential campaigns, back to Russian IP addresses. Cyber operations conducted by 
Russian state-sponsored actors against the public, primarily through social media 
                                                          
219 “Threat Group-4127 Targets Hillary Clinton Presidential Campaign.” Secureworks, 16 June 2016. 
www.secureworks.com/research/threat-group-4127-targets-hillary-clinton-presidential-campaign. 
220 Hacquebord, Feike. Two Years of Pawn Storm: Examining an Increasingly Relevant 
Threat. TrendMicro, 2017. https://documents.trendmicro.com/assets/wp/wp-two-years-of-pawn-storm.pdf.     
221 U.S. Senate. Select Committee on Intelligence. Prepared Statement of Janis Sarts, Director of NATO 
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Testimony. 1 November 2017. 115th Cong. 1st sess. 
Washington DC: Government Print Office, 2017. 
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sfr-jsarts-062817b.pdf.  
222 U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 
Recent US Election. 6 January 2017. (ICA 2017-01D). 
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.  
223 U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Cyber Division. Targeting Activity Against State Board of 
Election Systems. Washington DC: 18 August 2016. https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-
ElectionHacking.pdf. 
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platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, have been exposed by the independent media 
and confirmed by various intelligence services as well as the corporate leadership within 
the social media platforms.224225226227   
 These new types of cyber operations are an outgrowth of intelligence services 
adapting to emerging technologies. Russian intelligence agencies have a long history of 
leveraging any advantage and utilizing rival nation’s societal division to advance 
Russia’s geopolitical goals. These technological advances made many existing active 
measures, such as the dispersion of propaganda and disinformation, media manipulation, 
malign political influence, deception, the funding of extremist and opposition groups, 
spreading conspiracy theories and rumor, and espionage, immeasurably more effective.228 
By complementing existing Russian intelligence agencies’ active measures with cyber 
operations, these agencies were able to use active measures in innovative, while still 
untested, new ways to target numerous state electoral processes at a relatively low risk 
and cost.      
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228 Sipher, John. “Russian Active Measures and the 2016 Election Hack.” The Cipher Brief, 20 December 
2017. www.thecipherbrief.com/column_article/russian-active-measures-2016-election-hack.  
91 
 
• What were the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state 
actors to disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states 
through coordinated cyber operations? 
 Unfortunately, the answer to any question posed regarding the effects of cyber 
operations, or attempted cyber operations, on state electoral processes remains elusive 
and intensely contentious. While this thesis has provided both quantitative and qualitative 
data which point to the corrosive effects of cyber operations on state electoral processes, 
it cannot conclusively determine the effects. That being established, the data collected is 
somewhat persuasive in making the case that cyber operations are having a deleterious 
effect on electoral processes.  
By comparing “consolidated democracies”229 targeted by cyber operations against 
the data collected for a control group which had not experienced similar cyber operations, 
some alarming trends were uncovered. The test group of consolidated democracies 
experiencing attacks saw an average decrease in the group’s confidence in their national 
governments by 6% and an average increase in the group’s lack of confidence in their 
national governments by 10.8% during a period when Russia intelligence services were 
most active. Similarly, the group’s average confidence in the honesty of elections also 
saw dramatic changes, decreasing by 7.4%, while those who lack confidence rose by 10% 
over the same period. These trends only appeared more alarming when compared against 
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a control group of democracies which had not been targeted by extensive Russian cyber 
operations nor seen similar negative trends in public sentiment over the same period. The 
findings appear to suggest that in targeted consolidated democracies, Russian cyber 
operations were in fact having a corrosive effect on the public’s confidence in both the 
honesty of elections and their national governments.  
While the polling data established aggregate international trends which are 
noteworthy, the interview with former Ambassador & Permanent Representative of the 
Republic of Moldova to the United Nations, Vladimir Lupan, provided a more nuanced 
analysis of the long-term effects of unchecked Russian active measures and cyber 
operations. By Mr. Lupan’s telling, Russian intelligence agencies are actively pursuing 
the dissolution of the European Union and NATO and will use any and all methods that 
prove effective. His account outlined the various ways in which the Russian state 
attempts to coerce and manipulate smaller states through its energy and trade policy as 
well as directly supporting candidates, parties and factions within a state’s domestic 
politics. Mr. Lupan expressed grave concern over the lack of a unified, forceful response 
to Russian interference in state’s domestic politics and its pronounced disinformation 
campaigns. One of the key insights, however alarming, was Mr. Lupan’s assessment that 
Russian intelligence services will never be satisfied, rather they will continue to interfere 
in state’s domestic politics through cyber operations and any other means available until 
confronted.  
One question, not previously considered in this thesis, concerns what can be done 
to mitigate the effects of attempts by states, state-directed actors, or non-state actors to 
disrupt, alter or influence the electoral process in democratic states through coordinated 
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cyber operations. Fortunately, various governments currently combating these issues, in 
coordination with cyber security firms and international organizations, have already 
begun the work necessary to counter and expose Russian intelligence services ongoing 
cyber operations. While the countermeasures that have been taken are a response to 
Russian cyber operations, they offer solutions that may be applicable against cyber 
operations more broadly.   
The most widely emphasized guidance with regards to mitigating Russian 
disinformation and “Fake News” more generally, has been to increase the public’s 
awareness of the issue and its ability to think critically when considering sources of 
information. There are valuable lessons to be learned from the Baltic and Scandinavian 
nations which never saw the threat of Russian active measures completely disappear after 
the fall of the Soviet Union. Sweden, for example, has plans to implement a nationwide 
primary school programs to help students identify Russian propaganda.230 The program, 
which is scheduled to begin in July 2018, aims to increase student’s digital competence 
and increase their ability to differentiate between reliable and unreliable sources.231 This 
initiative was spurred on by national polling data which indicated that eight out of ten 
Swedes believed disinformation was having an impact on their perceptions of basic 
facts.232 Sweden is not alone in using the education system to bolster its resilience to the 
spread of disinformation. Holland and Finland have also set strong examples to follow, 
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while countries in southern Europe, like Italy, are experimenting with their own 
programs.233234  As the issue has become more prevalent, educational initiatives are 
gaining traction across Europe and the U.S. as NGOs and international advocates see 
their potential to blunt the effects of disinformation.235236 
Yet, systemic changes to national education systems are often slow processes 
which may not help to mitigate the spread of disinformation in the near-term. Due to 
these concerns, experts are also advocating for greater public awareness of the issue. Jed 
Willard, Director of the Harvard University-based FDR Center for Global Engagement 
offers very specific advice to craft a unified, national, public message which can serve as 
an alternative to disinformation narrative.237 Where Russian disinformation frequently 
employs negative and racialized messages meant to fray societal cohesion, Willard 
advises promoting a positive narrative which has broad appeal across the national 
political spectrum.238  
Jed Willard, who has advised both the Swedish and Finnish governments on these 
issues is wary of legislation which could restrict freedom of speech and could potentially 
be against those attempting to mitigate Russian disinformation.239 Adam Berinsky, a 
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Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) shared 
this assessment, emphasizing that members of the media and government officials should 
resist correcting Russian disinformation and instead highlight a positive national 
narrative.240 While many of these public awareness campaigns are still in development, 
there have been positive signs they are beginning to have an effect. For example, in 
Lithuania, citizens have begun volunteering their time to establish cyber-monitoring 
teams which have been identifying Russian-sponsored socialbots, content and Russian 
trolls presenting themselves as Lithuanians. Light-heartedly considering the fact that they 
battle Russian “Trolls” in cyberspace, they call themselves “Elves.”   
Beyond building greater resistance to Russian disinformation campaigns, many 
security experts across the Transatlantic community have been advocating greater 
coordination in approach and information sharing among allies. In the wake of Russia’s 
cyber operation on the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the European Commission’s 
European Political Strategy Centre issued a report calling for the creation of a “European 
Cyber Shield.”241 It envisioned a comprehensive cyber security defense strategy that 
would cover all member states and emphasize the protection of crucial industries such as 
communications, healthcare, security, energy, financial services, and IT services, as well 
as democratic institutions.242 The report noted the current fractured state of the EU’s 
cyber security and foresaw the need for greater international cooperation in the fields of 
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both IT security and intelligence.243 Enhancing cyber security cooperation and 
committing to the implementation of a EU-wide cyber security strategy should be among 
Europe’s top priorities.  
NATO appears to have learned the risks associated with Russia’s cyber operations 
earlier than the EU, but it too must reevaluate its cyber security apparatus and make 
greater efforts to build a comprehensive cyber defense that can protect all of its members. 
Following a trivial dispute between Estonia and Russia in 2007, Estonia was hit with a 
debilitating cyber-attack against governmental, financial and communications 
infrastructure which was widely attributed to Russia.244 Following this clear provocation, 
NATO issued its first Cyber Defense Policy in 2008.245 Yet, NATO remained largely 
reactionary, only calling for a Cyber Defense Pledge, under which all members were to 
make enhanced cyber resiliency a matter of priority, and sign the Technical Arrangement 
of Cyber Defense with the EU in 2016. While NATO and the EU officials have made 
joint declarations in which they have pledged greater cooperation on cyber security, 
concrete action must happen faster if it is to counteract Russian growing cyber 
operations. In addition to removing the institutional barriers to greater cyber cooperation, 
the EU and NATO should support and learn from the proactive cyber defense models for 
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combating Russian cyber operations that are being implemented in Scandinavia and the 
Baltics.246      
Unfortunately, considering the insight offered in a previous chapter from 
Vladimir Lupan, simply fortifying the West’s cyber security infrastructure and its 
public’s resistance to disinformation is unlikely to deter future Russian cyber operations. 
With the material costs associated with conducting cyber operations low and relatively 
few external disincentives placed on Russia for its operations, Russia continues to see 
cyber operations as a cost-effective method to undermine Western institutions. Only 
when the cost of Russia’s actions is considered greater than the potential benefits of its 
cyber operations will it be convinced to stop. Considering this insight, policymakers 
across the transatlantic community should turn to asymmetric forms of retaliation to 
counter Russian cyber aggression.  
There are numerous ways in which the transatlantic community could strike back 
against Russian cyber operations which exclude traditional kinetic force. Perhaps the 
most irritating to Vladimir Putin would be supporting democratic institutions and 
processes within Russia itself. This could include offering funding to the few remaining 
NGOs and independent media outlets still operating within Russia. It could not be done 
covertly, as such actions would likely be perceived as interfering in the country’s 
domestic politics, but rather overtly and in support of values enshrined in the Helsinki 
Final Act to which Russia is a signatory. American and European intelligence services 
should be recruited in this effort, to reveal verified corruption among Russia’s 
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intelligence services and oligarchs. To this end, the intelligence services could work to 
expose any corruption associated with energy or trade policy as well as alleged Russian 
assassination attempts, malign influence strategies and disinformation campaigns. Again, 
these efforts would need to be overt and verifiable as to not be perceived as an attempt at 
internal meddling in another country’s domestic politics.        
Thanks to U.S. and European dominance in the international financial sector, the 
transatlantic community has one very large asymmetric target to leverage against Russia. 
American and EU financial regulators should work in coordination to expose and freeze 
all Kremlin-linked money associated with organized crime and covert international 
political patronage. Further, the U.S. Treasury Department and the European Central 
Bank should work in concert to further identify and penalize the oligarchs who support 
Vladimir Putin’s regime and enable his foreign adventurism. This could include the 
freezing of internationally held assets and issuing personal travel restrictions to oligarchs 
as a means of isolating those who enable Putin’s maligning agenda.       
In this thesis, I have attempted to answer some of the most preliminary questions 
surrounding cyber operations and the impact they can have on electoral processes. In the 
course of the research, it became apparent that cyber operations are a broad category in 
which hackers and cyber security experts are continuously innovating. Many of these 
individual types of cyber operations certainly warrant further research. Alarmingly, the 
research has shown that cyber operations, even unsuccessful operations, are likely to have 
an impact on public perceptions of elections. Given the covert nature of cyber operations, 
I suspect additional details will inevitably emerge which provide greater insight on the 
precise impact cyber operations have on electoral processes, but as of this writing, that 
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precise impact remains elusive. As the threat associated with cyber operations becomes 
increasingly pervasive, it is heartening to see greater acknowledgement and collaboration 
across the fields of academia, cyber security and national defense to address this threat.   
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Annex A 
Additional information relevant to Chapter Six: Quantifying the Effects. Graphic 
representation of control group’s changing perceptions: 
 
 
 
 
63%
51%
29%
33%
53%
35%
29%
46%
57% 57% 60%
31%
47%
69%
65%
40%
63%
69%
52%
41% 38% 38%
5%
1% 2% 1%
7%
3% 3% 2% 1% 4% 2%
2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Irish Confidence in National 
Government
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
76.00%
70.00%
66.00% 63.00%
72.00%
65.00%
55.00%
68.00% 69.00% 71.00%
77.00%
18.00%
28.00% 31.00%
35.00%
25.00%
34.00%
44.00%
30.00% 29.00% 26.00%
22.00%
6.00%
2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 3.00% 1.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 2.00% 2.00%
2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Irish Confidence in Elections 
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
112 
 
 
 
 
 
26%
46%
43%
36% 37%
66%
39%
54%
61% 60%
8%
15%
3% 3% 4%
2008 2013 2015 2016 2017
Icelandic Confidence in National 
Government
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
84%
89% 91%
85% 87% 82%
13%
8% 6%
14% 12%
17%
4% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1%
2008 2012 2013 2015 2016 2017
Icelandic Confidence in Elections
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44%
64%
59% 61%
55% 55%
52% 51% 52%
64% 62%
54%
35%
39% 37%
43% 41%
46% 48% 47%
33%
38%
2% 2% 2% 2% 1%
4% 2% 1% 2% 3% 0%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Canadian Confidence in National 
Government
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
58%
72%
67%
70%
67%
72%
66%
59%
66% 68%
69%
40%
27%
31% 29% 31%
26%
32%
38%
33%
30% 30%
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 3% 3% 1% 1% 1%
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Canadian Confidence in Elections
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
114 
 
 
 
 
 
45%
34%
28%
24% 21% 23% 18%
23% 22%
35%
50%
35%
49%
59% 57%
64% 67%
76% 73% 72%
57%
42%
20% 17%
13%
19%
15%
10%
6% 4% 7%
8% 8%
2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Portuguese Confidence in National 
Government
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
59% 61%
68%
55%
59%
56%
48%
52%
42%
56% 57%
24% 25% 22%
25% 27%
32%
43% 44%
52%
40%
37%
17%
14%
10%
20%
14% 12%
8%
4% 5% 4%
7%
2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Portuguese Confidence in Elections
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
115 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82%
77% 77% 74% 74%
66% 69% 68%
74%
14%
20% 18% 19% 21%
30% 28% 30%
23%
4% 3% 5% 7% 5% 4% 3% 2% 3%
2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Luxembourgian Confidence in 
National Government
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
79%
74% 78%
79% 76% 77% 80% 76% 78%
16%
22%
16% 17% 18%
21% 19% 21% 18%
5% 3% 5% 3% 6% 2% 1% 3% 4%
2008 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Luxembourgian Confidence in 
Elections
Confidence No Confidence Unsure Confidence
116 
 
 
Graphic representation of test group’s changing perceptions: 
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Annex B 
From Chapter Seven: Russia’s International Meddling and Active Measures - An 
Interview with a Former Eastern European Official. Interview with Vladimir Lupan in its 
entirety:  
Interviewer: How would you describe relations between Russia 
and Moldova since Moldova signed the Association Agreement with the 
European Union in 2014? Can you elaborate on any role Russia may have 
in Moldova’s domestic politics with regards to the breakaway region of 
Transnistria? 
Vladimir: We have attempted several times throughout our history 
to approach the European Union, with the idea of becoming a member of 
the European Union. Most of the time it resulted in some form of 
intervention either by Russian or Moldovan political forces related to 
Russia or statements made by Russia itself, because this is how it works in 
Moldova. It also works with economic embargos. Russians have 
repeatedly introduced embargos which essentially blocked Moldovan 
goods from being exported to Russia which was one of its traditional 
markets. This happened in 1999 when we had a multiparty agreement 
signed and in 2000 when we had a constitutional change. This was when 
the Communist Party had to re-register its name to the “Party of 
Communists of the Republic of Moldova” and they entered the election on 
the wave of economic crisis and nostalgia for the Soviet Union, focusing 
on the relation with Russia, not with the European Union. So, for them 
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that was the message they sent throughout the election: we will enter a 
Russian union as well. As you can see, if you look at the map there is a 
problem because in between Russia and Moldova there is Ukraine which 
divides us. At that time relations were better between the two, which is a 
different issue, however in 2003 due to internal and external pressures the 
Party of Communists failed to sign a memorandum which would 
essentially put Moldova in Russia’s pocket. Part of this is related to the 
way in which Russia has used the Transnistria conflict to maintain 
influence in Moldova. It was the Kozak Memorandum. Putin’s chief of 
staff was in charge of that agreement, Dmitry Kozak. This agreement 
basically provided Russia with veto powers through the separatists, as the 
separatists alone had veto power on foreign policy and the Constitutional 
Court, when no one else in parament would. It was well known, in the 
2000s we were moving closer to the EU. In 1998, there was even a 
partnership agreement with the EU and we began negotiating the 
partnership agreement in 1994 and it was agreed to in 1998. In 1999-2000 
there was an agreement to upgrade the partnership. Moldova only became 
independent in 1991 and started negotiating with the EU in 1994 so it was 
only three years. Moldova has a history of moving towards the EU, 
practically from its independence but Russia showed its true face with the 
Kozak Memorandum. What was the purpose of this exclusive veto power 
for the separatists? It is to give them autonomy and Russia has influence 
over this faction. It’s is purely an attempt to grant them leverage over 
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Moldova. They would have the power in the decision process, we called 
this the Transnistria-ization of Moldova. Later, you also saw the 
Transnistria-ization of Ukraine and the developments were essentially the 
same. This process involves federalization which sounds good but the plan 
was written by Russia in such a manner to give a small actor veto power 
over the larger actor be it Moldova or Ukraine while Russia maintains 
influence over that small minority. You can even see these same tactics 
being applied in the United States, it’s a different matter but during the 
2016 elections there were numerous succession groups in the United 
States that were supported by Russia. In this way Moldova is a testing 
ground. However, in 2013, in Moldova you saw a backlash both internally 
and externally which caused the Party of Communists to reject the Kozak 
Memorandum and Russia responded harshly with the embargo of wines 
and manipulation of energy, in the form of gas, prices. It was a form of 
punishment. You could see Germany paying less for gas than Moldova 
even though it is farther from Russia. The EU does not act with a single 
voice so it’s much easier to attempt to divide and conquer the member 
states. It’s worth remembering that Vladimir Putin was the head of the 
KGB an organization that had worked on dividing and conquering Europe 
for years.  
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Interviewer: You’ve called Moldova a testing ground for Russian 
political interference on Twitter and in response to the Russian 
disinformation campaigns in July, 2017, the Moldovan Parliament finally 
adopted an Anti-Propaganda Law. Can you explain what prompted the 
law, how it was justified and received domestically and if you believe it’s 
proving effective?  
Vladimir: When I say Moldova is a “testing ground” you have to 
understand that I’m referring to the use of proxies, and by proxy, I mean a 
military that will do the dirty work without wearing your insignia. This 
concept is equally applicable in all Russia’s efforts and not necessarily 
only military. Try to be more flexible in your thinking. Whatever means 
Russia can find in a country to use it against that country, if it is a political 
party or a paramilitary, if it’s a struggling population longing for some 
specific relation or benefits from Russia then they will become a 
paramilitary, if there is a hacker who is interested in making the 
government pay a price, for example Edward Snowden and the U.S., then 
they will use that against the country. They will use Wikileaks to release 
documents or when possible, they will use their own “patriotic” hackers to 
release any data when possible. With the anti-propaganda law, this law is 
theoretically welcome in Moldova because it is blocking Russian 
propaganda, however it is all about implementation and when it comes to 
implementation, Mr. Plahotniuc appears in all the news. The news still has 
Russian content, or its about Mr. Plahotniuc, [the former chairman of the 
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Democratic Party of Moldova and a media magnate] so he essentially 
transforms the Russian messaging into political messaging about himself. 
This is not even a pre-electoral message, this is essential a propagandistic 
message, the type that Russia had been using but he has transformed to 
serve himself. The use is duel actually. You block the Russian 
propaganda, show the West “look I’m protecting against Russia” and then 
he adapts their tactics and uses it against our own population and against 
internal enemies. If you look at opinion polling, Mr. Plahotniuc is not very 
popular right now, what is important for him, is popularity, he needs to be 
elected somehow. 
 
Interviewer: Pro-Russian media in Moldova have been spreading 
news of the imminent restitution of historical land and property held by 
Ukrainian citizens to Poland and likewise Moldovans having to return land 
and property to Romania. According to these fake reports, the Association 
Agreements that both Ukraine and Moldova signed with the European 
Union in 2014 calls for such restitution. The Association Agreement calls 
for nothing of this sort. What effects have such online “fake news” sources 
had on Moldova and how can “fake news” propagated online be 
neutralized?  
Vladimir: It’s funny you mention this. These stories of Moldova 
having to give territory back to Romania. Here in New York, I was sitting 
with my Russian barber and he asked me about this very issue. He asked 
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me why Moldovans would accept giving up territory in order to join the 
European Union. I asked him where he had heard this and he pointed to 
his television. It was on Russia-1 [a state-sponsored, Russian language 
channel carried internationally]. I told him it wasn’t the case which he had 
trouble believing. This is occurring all the time and because there are few 
channels here in Russian many Russians who live abroad see these types 
of reports. They have an effect. There is disinformation but you should 
look up the concept of Whataboutism by the journalist Michael Bernard, 
its similar to the tu quoque logical fallacy. It is a technique the Soviets 
used where if someone says something critical, you change the topic to 
something distracting and more preferable. Americans would object to a 
specific Soviet human rights abuse and the Soviets would counter with 
something like “What about racism in America?” Obviously, both aren’t 
good but the objective of the person using Whataboutism was to change 
the subject. How can “fake news” propagated online be neutralized? Well, 
as we saw, this is difficult. There can be laws but as in Moldova you have 
to see the details of those laws. 
 
Interviewer: Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, the 
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the Federal Security Services 
(FSB) are believed to have played a part in Russia’s interference in the 
2016 US presidential election through online groups respectively known 
as “Fancy Bear” and “Cozy Bear” by penetrating the Democratic National 
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Committee (DNC) in 2015 and releasing stolen and compromising 
information at a time when it would have the greatest political impact. 
Have you seen any comparable efforts in past Moldovan elections or do 
you suspect they could take place in next year’s parliamentary elections?  
Vladimir: In Moldova, the tactics used by Russia are more brazen. 
They can use tactics they wouldn’t dare to use in the United States. Rather 
than covertly attempting to manipulate an election, they can afford to be 
overt in their support of a party or candidates. This is combined with 
disinformation against candidates who stand up to Russia or promote 
deeper integration with the European Union. In this was the situation is 
different between Moldova and the United States.   
 
Interviewer: Russia has a long record of targeting outspoken critics 
in an attempt to delegitimize them in the public eye. Considering your 
position and outspoken criticism of Russian propaganda campaigns, have 
you had any experiences with cyber intrusion or attempts to compromise 
your character that you would be willing to share?     
Vladimir: This occurred when I was serving as the Ambassador & 
Permanent Representative of Moldova to the United Nations over the 
Russian involvement in Syria. There were Russian media reports claiming 
I had proposed rescinding Russia’s veto authority on the United Nations 
Security Council. This is impossible. There is absolutely nothing in the 
128 
 
UN Charter about removing a Security Council member’s right to a veto. 
There is no mechanism for that, so it would be impossible. This was about 
building pressure diplomatically. Similar circumstances happened to 
others at the UN over Russian involvement in eastern Ukraine. As you 
know, Moldova is not on the Security Council and even if it was, there is 
no way to take away a veto from a Security Council member. It fits a 
pattern though, they take elements of truth, in this case, another diplomat 
had proposed a resolution in which veto authority would be challenged on 
a one-time issue for countries that prevented serious inquires on war 
crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide and shape it to their 
purposes.      
 
Interviewer: What are the long-term objectives of Russia’s cyber 
aggression and propaganda campaigns? 
Vladimir: The purpose of Russian ops is not only to deceive the 
West but also to destroy the values of the West. They target our collective 
values. They want to destroy the rule of law in these countries. They want 
to undermine the EU and NATO. They do this by bashing relations 
between countries with things like gas price manipulation and they do it 
within countries by bashing certain political parties. It’s about freedom to 
act. It’s about realpolitik, when certain national security issues are present, 
Russia understands realpolitik well and they use the resources available. 
Essentially, Russia sees the United States as a country that can prohibit 
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them, for external and internal reasons, from expanding. Therefore, any 
attempt by an administration to try to stop Russian actions will actually 
face some sort of response. In order to solve a problem, you need to have a 
willing partner, that’s the bilateral part of negotiations, you need to agree 
on a certain set of actions, up to now I have not seen Russia willing to 
stop. What we’ve see is Russia trying to restore its status as a superpower, 
which they are incapable of. They are a regional power but not a 
superpower, they cannot do more than that.  
